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How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies

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  • Huber, John D.

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between cabinet instability and political performance in parliamentary democracies. I develop two theoretical arguments about how cabinet instability should affect government effectiveness, and I use these to define several measures of instability. The first argument suggests that instability in the partisan composition of cabinets should make it difficult for governments to adopt and implement new policy programs. The second argument suggests that instability in the partisan control of portfolios within the government (portfolio volatility) should make it difficult for cabinet ministers to obtain relevant information during policy formulation and implementation. I test both arguments by examining the short- and long-run effect of the instability variables on success at health care cost containment. The analysis indicates that short-run increases in portfolio volatility present problems for government decision makers, but in the long run, unstable systems are able to address the problem that instability poses.

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  • Huber, John D., 1998. "How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 577-591, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:92:y:1998:i:03:p:577-591_21
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    Cited by:

    1. Li-Lin Liang & Andrew J Mirelman, 2014. "Why Do Some Countries Spend More for Health? An Assessment of Sociopolitical Determinants and International Aid for Government Health Expenditures," Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Discussion Paper Series 88182, The World Bank.
    2. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2003. "Political Instability, Uncertainty and Economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 1-54, February.
    3. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2000. "Political Bias in Fiscal Policy Formation: an Econometric Analysis of Coalition Systems," Working Papers 28, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2000.
    4. Tang, Ryan W., 2023. "Institutional unpredictability and foreign exit−reentry dynamics: The moderating role of foreign ownership," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 58(2).
    5. Liang, Li-Lin & Mirelman, Andrew J., 2014. "Why do some countries spend more for health? An assessment of sociopolitical determinants and international aid for government health expenditures," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 161-168.
    6. Maoz Rosenthal, 2012. "Agenda control in an unstable multiparty parliamentary democracy: evidence from the Israeli public sector," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 22-44, March.

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