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Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending

Author

Listed:
  • King, Gary
  • Laver, Michael
  • Hofferbert, Richard I.
  • Budge, Ian
  • McDonald, Michael D.

Abstract

In their 1990 Review article, Ian Budge and Richard Hofferbert analyzed the relationship between party platform emphases, control of the White House, and national government spending priorities, reporting strong evidence of a “party mandate†connection between them. Gary King and Michael Laver successfully replicate the original analysis, critique the interpretation of the causal effects, and present a reanalysis showing that platforms have small or nonexistent effects on spending. In response, Budge, Hofferbert, and Michael McDonald agree that their language was somewhat inconsistent on both interactions and causality but defend their conceptualization of “mandates†as involving only an association, not necessarily a causal connection, between party commitments and government policy. Hence, while the causes of government policy are of interest, noncausal associations are sufficient as evidence of party mandates in American politics.

Suggested Citation

  • King, Gary & Laver, Michael & Hofferbert, Richard I. & Budge, Ian & McDonald, Michael D., 1993. "Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government Spending," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 744-750, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:03:p:744-750_10
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Bräuninger, 2005. "A partisan model of government expenditure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 409-429, December.
    2. Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006. "Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    3. Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.
    4. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2013. "Elections, leaders, and the composition of government spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 18-31.

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