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Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections

Author

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  • Campbell, James E.
  • Sumners, Joe A.

Abstract

Despite the diminished importance of partisanship, greater split-ticket voting, and a growth in Senate campaign spending, a party's presidential vote in the states remains positively related to its Senate vote in recent elections. We investigate to what extent presidential coattails are responsible for this association. State election returns for Senate and presidential contests are examined in presidential election years from 1972 to 1988. The analysis indicates that (1) presidential coattails exert a modest but significant influence on the Senate vote, probably affecting the election outcomes in twelve cases, and (2) partisanship remains a significant linkage between presidential and Senate elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Campbell, James E. & Sumners, Joe A., 1990. "Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 513-524, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:02:p:513-524_19
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    Cited by:

    1. Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "A political agency model of coattail voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1652-1660.
    2. Ade, Florian & Freier, Ronny, 2013. "Divided government versus incumbency externality effect—Quasi-experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    3. Bennett, Daniel L. & Long, Jason T., 2019. "Is it the economic policy, stupid? Economic policy, political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 118-137.
    4. Gomberg, Andrei & Gutiérrez, Emilio & López, Paulina & Vázquez, Alejandra, 2019. "Coattails and the forces that drive them: Evidence from Mexico," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 64-81.
    5. Marta Curto-Grau & Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2012. "Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain," Working Papers 2012/31, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    6. Florian Ade & Ronny Freier, 2011. "Divided Government versus Incumbency Externality Effect - Quasi-experimental Evidence on Multiple Voting Decisions," CESifo Working Paper Series 3683, CESifo.
    7. Alberto Alesina & Morris Fiorina & Howard Rosenthal, 1991. "Why Are There So Many Divided Senate Delegations?," NBER Working Papers 3663, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Marta Curto-Grau (Universitat de Barcelona) & Albert Sole-Olle (Universitat de Barcelona) & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro(Universitat de Barcelona), 2012. "Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain," Working Papers in Economics 288, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    9. Balasubramaniam, Vimal & Bhatiya, Apurav Yash & Das, Sabyasachi, 2020. "Synchronized Elections,Voter Behavior and Governance Outcomes : Evidence from India," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1276, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    10. Halberstam, Yosh & Montagnes, B. Pablo, 2015. "Presidential coattails versus the median voter: Senator selection in US elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 40-51.

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