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Pluralism and Social Choice

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  • Miller, Nicholas R.

Abstract

Pluralist political theory identifies certain patterns of political preferences as promoting the “stability†of democratic political systems and others as threatening to such stability. Social choice theory likewise identifies certain patterns of political preferences as leading to “stability†in social choice under majority rule and related collective decision rules, and other patterns as leading to “unstable†social choice. But the preference patterns identified by pluralist theory as promoting stability are essentially those identified by social choice theory as entailing instability. Thus the notions of stability and the implicit normative criteria associated with the two theories are very close to being logically incompatible. This incompatibility suggests that the social choice ideal of collective rationality may not be one that we should endorse. Indeed, the generic instability of the pluralist political process and its consequent collective irrationality may contribute to the stability of pluralist political systems.

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  • Miller, Nicholas R., 1983. "Pluralism and Social Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 734-747, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:77:y:1983:i:03:p:734-747_24
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    Cited by:

    1. Andranik Tangian, 2013. "German parliamentary elections 2009 from the viewpoint of direct democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 833-869, March.
    2. Fujun Hou, 2022. "Conditions for none to be whipped by `Rank and Yank' under the majority rule," Papers 2208.05093, arXiv.org.
    3. Hennie Kotzé & Pierre Du Toit, 1995. "The State, Civil Society, and Democratic Transition in South Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(1), pages 27-48, March.
    4. William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
    5. Kyriacou, Andreas P., 2000. "An Ethnically Based Federal and Bicameral System: The case of Cyprus," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 251-268, June.
    6. Andranik Tangian, 2008. "A mathematical model of Athenian democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 537-572, December.
    7. Tangian, Andranik S., 2013. "2013 election to German Bundestag from the viewpoint of direct democracy," WSI Working Papers 186, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    8. Thomas H. Hammond, 2015. "A unified spatial model of American political institutions," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 11, pages 182-200, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Tangian, Andranik S., 2013. "Decision making in politics and economics: 5. 2013 election to German Bundestag and direct democracy," Working Paper Series in Economics 49, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    10. Bernard GROFMAN & Joseph GODFREY, 2014. "Aspiration Models of Committee Decision Making," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2014-04-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    11. Tangian, Andranik S., 2010. "Representativeness of German parties and trade unions with regard to public opinion," WSI Working Papers 173, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    12. John Chamberlin, 1986. "Discovering manipulated social choices: The coincidence of cycles and manipulated outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 295-313, January.
    13. A. J. McGann, 2004. "The Tyranny of the Supermajority," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 53-77, January.
    14. Andranik Tangian, 2017. "Policy Representation of a Parliament: The Case of the German Bundestag 2013 Elections," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 151-179, January.
    15. Tangian, Andranik S., 2006. "German parliamentary elections 2005 in the mirror of party manifestos," WSI Working Papers 139E, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    16. Jan Sauermann, 2021. "The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 1-20, January.
    17. Tangian, Andranik, 2006. "Evaluation of Parties and Coalitions After Parliamentary Elections," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12165, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    18. Krishna K Ladha, 2012. "Aristotle’s Politics: On Constitutions, Justice, Laws and Stability," Working papers 104, Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode.
    19. Matthew C. Stephenson, 2013. "Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 331-368.
    20. Tangian, Andranik, 2010. "Evaluation of German parties and coalitions by methods of the mathematical theory of democracy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(1), pages 294-307, April.
    21. Hugh Ward & Albert Weale, 2010. "Is Rule by Majorities Special?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58(1), pages 26-46, February.
    22. Valeria Ottonelli & Daniele Porello, 2013. "On the elusive notion of meta-agreement," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 12(1), pages 68-92, February.
    23. Sauermann, Jan & Schwaninger, Manuel & Kittel, Bernhard, 2022. "Making and breaking coalitions: Strategic sophistication and prosociality in majority decisions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).

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