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Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party

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  • Kernell, Samuel

Abstract

Midterm congressional elections have been generally viewed as relatively sterile affairs marked by reduced turnout, party voting, and the play of politically idiosyncratic forces such as friends-and-neighbors voting. The usual reduction in the number of seats controlled by the President's party, according to the “surge and decline†thesis, simply reflects the departure of short-term forces which presumably benefited the president's party two years earlier. In this study an alternative thesis is proposed which considers midterm election outcomes within the context of the current political environment. Evaluations of the President's performance are found to be directly associated with congressional preferences over a series of midterm elections from 1946 through 1966. Moreover, controlling for party identification, persons who disapprove of the President's performance were generally more likely to vote and to cast their ballot against the President's party than were his admirers to support it. This “negative voting†bias helps to explain why the Democratic and Republican parties have performed more poorly in those midterm elections during which they occupy the White House.

Suggested Citation

  • Kernell, Samuel, 1977. "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 44-66, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:01:p:44-66_25
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    1. Asger Lau Andersen & David Dreyer Lassen & Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen, 2012. "Late Budgets," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 1-40, November.
      • Asger L. Andersen & David Dreyer Lassen & Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen, 2010. "Late Budgets," EPRU Working Paper Series 2010-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    2. Daniel J. Smith & George R. Crowley & J. Sebastian Leguizamon, 2021. "Long live the doge? Death as a term limit on Venetian chief executives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 333-359, September.
    3. Knight, Brian, 2017. "An Econometric Evaluation of Competing Explanations for the Midterm Gap," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 12(2), pages 205-239, September.
    4. Julie Berry Cullen & Nicholas Turner & Ebonya Washington, 2021. "Political Alignment, Attitudes toward Government, and Tax Evasion," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 135-166, August.
    5. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    6. Burkhart, Simone, 2008. "Blockierte Politik: Ursachen und Folgen von "Divided Government" in Deutschland," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 60, number 60.
    7. Saito, Hiroharu, 2022. "Loss aversion for the value of voting rights: WTA/WTP ratios for a ballot," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    8. Francesco Passarelli, 2011. "Risky Political Changes: Rational Choice vs Prospect Theory," ISLA Working Papers 39, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    9. John V. Duca & Jason L. Saving, 2008. "Stock Ownership And Congressional Elections: The Political Economy Of The Mutual Fund Revolution," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 454-479, July.
    10. Federico Ferrara & J. Timo Weishaupt, 2004. "Get your Act Together," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(3), pages 283-306, September.
    11. Höhler, Julia & Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2016. "Der Milchpreis In Der Deutschen Presse: Nur „Milchkrisen“ In Der Berichterstattung?," 56th Annual Conference, Bonn, Germany, September 28-30, 2016 244869, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    12. Danny Hayes & Jennifer L. Lawless & Gail Baitinger, 2014. "Who Cares What They Wear? Media, Gender, and the Influence of Candidate Appearance," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1194-1212, December.
    13. Manow, Philip, 2005. "National Vote Intention and European Voting Behavior, 1979-2004: Second Order Election Effects, Election Timing, Government Approval and the Europeanization of European Elections," MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/11, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    14. Jason R. Koepke & Nils Ringe, 2006. "The Second-order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 321-346, September.
    15. Dieter Stiers & Anna Kern, 2021. "Cyclical accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(1), pages 31-49, October.
    16. Burkhart, Simone, 2004. "Parteipolitikverflechtung: Der Einfluss der Bundespolitik auf Landtagswahlentscheidungen von 1976 bis 2002," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    17. Halberstam, Yosh & Montagnes, B. Pablo, 2015. "Presidential coattails versus the median voter: Senator selection in US elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 40-51.

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