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A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives

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  • Black, Gordon S.

Abstract

Office-holders periodically face the problem of choosing among a set of career alternatives, and these alternatives customarily include the choice of dropping out of political life, or seeking reelection, or of choosing to seek higher office. This paper assumes that officeholders behave according to a rational calculus in making such choices, and that the main elements involved in the choice process include the probabilities and values attached by the candidate to his alternatives, and the investments required to obtain these alternatives. Political ambition, or the desire to seek higher office, is shown to develop as a product of the investments that politicians make in their political careers, and the investments are shown to be associated with the structural characteristics of community size and electoral competitiveness. The subjects of the research are 435 city councilmen from 89 cities of the San Francisco Bay Region, and the data include information derived from interviews with the councilmen and aggregate election data collected on each city.

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  • Black, Gordon S., 1972. "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 144-159, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:66:y:1972:i:01:p:144-159_13
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Carsey & William Berry, 2014. "What’s a losing party to do? The calculus of contesting state legislative elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 251-273, July.
    2. Kevin Arceneaux & Johanna Dunaway & Martin Johnson & Ryan J. Vander Wielen, 2020. "Strategic Candidate Entry and Congressional Elections in the Era of Fox News," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 398-415, April.
    3. Yongwook Paik & Sukhun Kang & Robert Seamans, 2019. "Entrepreneurship, innovation, and political competition: How the public sector helps the sharing economy create value," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 503-532, April.
    4. Wingrove, Sara & Fitzsimons, Gráinne M., 2022. "Interpersonal consequences of conveying goal ambition," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    5. Kentaro Fukumoto, 2009. "Systematically Dependent Competing Risks and Strategic Retirement," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 740-754, July.
    6. Chatterji, Aaron K. & Kim, Joowon & McDevitt, Ryan C., 2018. "School spirit: Legislator school ties and state funding for higher education," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 254-269.
    7. Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen & Andreja Pegan, 2023. "Blurred lines between electoral and parliamentary representation: The use of constituency staff among Members of the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 239-263, June.
    8. Ryan Brown & Hani Mansour & Stephen O'Connell & James Reeves, 2019. "Gender Differences in Political Career Progression: Evidence from U.S. Elections," CESifo Working Paper Series 7821, CESifo.
    9. Balian Arpie G. & Gasparyan Arman, 2017. "What Drives Politicians to Run for Office: Money, Fame or Public Service?," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 10(1), pages 9-38, June.
    10. Sutter, Daniel & Poitras, Marc, 2008. "Political hierarchies and political shirking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 334-356, February.
    11. Anselm Hager & Lukas Hensel & Johannes Hermle & Christopher Roth, 2024. "Political Activists are Not Driven by Instrumental Motives: Evidence from Two Natural Field Experiments," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 274, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    12. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2013. "Running for office again: evidence from Portuguese municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 677-702, September.
    13. Linda Fowler, 1979. "The electoral lottery: Decisions to run for Congress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 399-418, September.
    14. Robert van Geffen, 2016. "Impact of Career Paths on MEPs’ Activities," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 1017-1032, July.

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