L’autorité ne fait pas le contrat de travail : Une critique du modèle de Simon (1951)
AbstractContinental Law defines the employment contract by the “subordination” of the employee to the employer. Since Simon (1951), economics defines authority as the opportunity for the employer to postpone the selection of the tasks the employee should perform. These definitions do not fit. Using the framework of option pricing in order to interpret Simon’s model, this paper shows that the economic concept of the employment contract is a spot contract paired with a call option on the employee’s tasks. Therefore, the economic formalization of the employment contract does not implement what lawyers define as an employment relationship.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by L'Harmattan in its journal Cahiers d'économie Politique.
Volume (Year): (2010)
Issue (Month): 58 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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