Anti-dumping measures as a tool of protectionism: A mechanism design approach

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Anti-dumping measures as a tool of protectionism: A mechanism design approach

Author Info

Leonard K. Cheng
Larry D. Qiu
Kit Pong Wong

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Larry Dongxiao Qiu

Abstract

In this paper we explore the design of optimal incentive-compatible anti-dumping (AD) measures. When the weight given to the domestic firm's profit in the government's objective function is relatively small, it is shown that no AD duty should be imposed if the foreign firm reports its own costs, but a constant AD duty should be imposed if the domestic firm reports the foreign firm's cost. When this weight is large, in either case of reporting the AD duty is a prohibitive tariff. The optimal AD measures are modified in the presence of a GATT/WTO constraint.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 34 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 639-660
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:34:y:2001:i:3:p:639-660

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Email:
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Huasheng Song & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2008. "Trade Policy and Innovation," LICOS Discussion Papers 20008, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, K.U.Leuven. [Downloadable!]
Matloob Piracha, 2004. "Export Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Under Asymmetric Information," Studies in Economics 0410, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
Xenia Matschke & Anja Schöttner, 2009. "Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Xenia Matschke & Anja Schottner, 2008. "Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information," Working papers 2008-19, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 80% of the top 1000 economists are registered on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.