Optimal Tariffs in the Presence of Middlemen
AbstractIn this paper, the authors examine the question of optimal tariffs when producers and sellers are different entities. A number of alternative market structures are considered. It is found that the sign of the optimal tariff may depend on the nature of the producer-seller relationship, viz., who the leader is. In particular, the authors find that the optimal tariff is negative when the only seller is the leader and there is only one foreign producer. There is also a case where it is optimal for the government of the home country to subsidize imports no matter who the leader is.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 32 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
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- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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- Gjermund Nese & Odd Straume, 2007. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, March.
- Nese, Gjermund & Straume, Odd Rune, 2004.
"Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly,"
Working Papers in Economics
10/04, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Gjermund Nese & Odd Rune Straume, 2005. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," CESifo Working Paper Series 1439, CESifo Group Munich.
- Yoshiyasu Ono, 2006. "Protective Trade Policies 'Reduce' Employment: A Dynamic Optimization Approach," ISER Discussion Paper 0659, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Takauchi, Kazuhiro, 2012. "International R&D Rivalry with a Shipping Firm," MPRA Paper 36843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gjermund Nese & Odd Straume, 2007. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, March.
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