L'approche néo-institutionnelle de la réforme des industries de réseaux
AbstractIn Welfare Economics natural monopoly and price theory have been given as the relevant framework for analyzing network industries. New Institutional Economics and the experiment in reforming these industries suggest that contracting for being served is the critical point. Contractual difficulties come notably from the use of various specific assets and from network externalities and explain the empirical diversity of network industries reforms. Classification JEL : D23, H23, K23, L5, L9
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 53 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Jean-Michel Glachant, 2002. "L'approche néo-institutionnelle de la réforme des industries de réseaux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(3), pages 425-435.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
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- Julia Taddei, 2004. "Gouvernance de la coopération horizontale entre gestionnaires européens d'infrastructures ferroviaires et interopérabilité," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r04043, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Glachant, Jean-Michel & Dubois, Ute & Perez, Yannick, 2008. "Deregulating with no regulator: Is the German electricity transmission regime institutionally correct?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1600-1610, May.
- Hallack, Michelle & Vazquez, Miguel, 2013. "European Union regulation of gas transmission services: Challenges in the allocation of network resources through entry/exit schemes," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 23-32.
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