IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/evoice/v8y2011i1n3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why Official Bailouts Tend Not To Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010

Author

Listed:
  • Chamley Christophe P

    (Boston University)

  • Pinto Brian

    (World Bank)

Abstract

Christophe Chamley of Boston University and Brian Pinto of the World Bank use recent events in Greece to illustrate that official bailouts tend not to work when countries have fundamental fiscal (insolvency') problems and construct a two-period numerical example to explain why this should not come as a surprise.

Suggested Citation

  • Chamley Christophe P & Pinto Brian, 2011. "Why Official Bailouts Tend Not To Work: An Example Motivated by Greece 2010," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-5, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:8:y:2011:i:1:n:3
    DOI: 10.2202/1553-3832.1821
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1553-3832.1821
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1553-3832.1821?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Erdal Atukeren & Emrah İ. Çevik & Turhan Korkmaz, 2015. "Downside business confidence spillovers in Europe: evidence from causality-in-risk tests," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 18(4), pages 341-357, October.
    2. Hatgioannides, John & Karanassou, Marika, 2011. "Warrant Economics, Call-Put Policy Options and the Fallacies of Economic Theory," IZA Discussion Papers 6251, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. John Hatgioannides & Marika Karanassou, 2011. "Warrant Economics, Call-Put Policy Options and the Fallacies of Economic Theory," Working Papers 686, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    4. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2017. "Multilateral Loans and Interest Rates: Further Evidence on the Seniority Conundrum," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(2), pages 169-178, April.
    5. Gonzalo Fernandez-de-Cordoba & Pau Pujolas & Jose Torres, 2017. "Fiscal Discipline and Defaults," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 24, pages 1-13, March.
    6. Chamley, Christophe & Pinto, Brian, 2012. "Sovereign bailouts and senior loans," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6181, The World Bank.
    7. Gonzalo F. de-Córdoba & Benedetto Molinari & José L. Torres, 2021. "Public Debt Frontier: A Python Toolkit for Analyzing Public Debt Sustainability," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(23), pages 1-25, November.
    8. Aizenman, Joshua & Hutchison, Michael & Jinjarak, Yothin, 2013. "What is the risk of European sovereign debt defaults? Fiscal space, CDS spreads and market pricing of risk," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 37-59.
    9. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
    10. Ashoka Mody, 2015. "Living (dangerously) without a fiscal union," Working Papers 875, Bruegel.
    11. Gonzalo F. de-Córdoba & Benedetto Molinari & José L. Torres, 2018. "Public Debt Frontier. A toolkit for analyzing fiscal policy and debt sustainability," Working Paper series 18-36, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    12. Christophe Chamley & Brian Pinto, 2012. "Sovereign Bailouts and Senior Loans," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2012, pages 269-291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Canuto, Otaviano & Pinto, Brian & Prasad, Mona, 2012. "Orderly sovereign debt restructuring : missing in action !," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6054, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:8:y:2011:i:1:n:3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.