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Sovereign bailouts and senior loans

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  • Chamley, Christophe
  • Pinto, Brian
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    Abstract

    Institutional lending in crisis is evaluated from a theoretical point of view. First, the share of senior loans in new loans is irrelevant under a given probability distribution of the country's resources. Second, seniority may partially alleviate the inefficiency of debt contracts when the distribution of resources is endogenous to the country's physical investment and effort towards success. Third, with multiple lending rate equilibria, institutional lending may induce a switch to a lower private loan rate if it can be done in a sufficiently large amount. Fourth, conditions are analyzed under which debt forgiveness is efficient under a financial shock.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 6181.

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    Date of creation: 01 Aug 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6181

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    Related research

    Keywords: Debt Markets; Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress; Economic Theory&Research; Financial Intermediation; External Debt;

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    1. Diego Saravia, 2009. "On The Role and Effects of IMF Seniority," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile, Central Bank of Chile 538, Central Bank of Chile.
    2. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," Levine's Working Paper Archive 114, David K. Levine.
    3. Mark Abrahamson & Tim Jenkinson & Howard Jones, 2011. "Why Don't U.S. Issuers Demand European Fees for IPOs?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 66(6), pages 2055-2082, December.
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