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Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution

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Author Info
Klaus Kultti (University of Helsinki)
Hannu Vartiainen (Turku School of Economics and Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation)

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Abstract

We apply the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set to the n-player cake division problem. Only time-preferences á la Rubinstein (1982) are assumed. The stable set is defined with respect to the following dominance relation: x dominates y if there is a player who prefers x over y even with one period lag. The Nash bargaining solution is characterized in the language of stable sets. Through the characterization, we establish the existence and uniqueness of the Nash solution.

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File URL: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1251&context=bejte
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:41

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Related research
Keywords: stable set; bargaining; Nash solution; time-preferences;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Fishburn, Peter C & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Time Preference," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(3), pages 677-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-86, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The time-preference Nash solution," Economic theory and game theory 019, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Klaus Kultti & Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result," Discussion Papers 32, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "A conflict-free arbitration scheme in a large population," Discussion Papers 34, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
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