A conflict-free arbitration scheme in a large population
AbstractThis paper studies allocations that can be implemented by an arbitrator subject to the constraint that the agents' outside option is to start bargaining by themselves. As the population becomes large, the set of implementable allocations shrinks to a singleton point - the conflict-free allocation. Finally, the conflict-free allocation can be implemented via a simple "lobbying" game where parties composed of agents with similar preferences bid for the right to be the first proposer in a bargaining game among the parties, i.e. in the "political game".
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 34.
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
non-cooperative bargaining; arbitration; implementation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-01-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2009-01-17 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result,"
32, Aboa Centre for Economics.
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- Kultti Klaus & Vartiainen Hannu, 2007. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, November.
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