The Institutions Of The European Union – An Analytical Approach Of Public Choice Theory And Institutional Economics
AbstractThe paper is developing an analysis of the delegation of decisionmaking competencies towards different political levels of the multi-levelgovernance in the European Union. The theory of public choice is used to explain decisions taken by the citizens of the union and the political actors having the decision-making competence on the national or on the supranational level. Starting from the concept of the homo economicus the theory of transaction costs, externalities and public goods is used to give an overview about the efficiency of internal and external institutions. This helps to analyse the question how an adequate delegation of decision-making towards the multi-level-governance should look like and what consequences could be drawn towards the calculation of costs and benefits for the European society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences in its journal Revista economica.
Volume (Year): 40 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Postal: Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences Dumbravii Avenue, No.17, postal code 550324, Sibiu, Romania
Phone: 004 0269 210375
Fax: 004 0269 210375
Web page: http://economice.ulbsibiu.ro/
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European Union; Economic Integration; Welfare Systems; Institutional Economics; Public Choice Theory;
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- Dahlman, Carl J, 1979. "The Problem of Externality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 141-62, April.
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