IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/pacecr/v10y2005i3p341-360.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Institutionalized Corruption And Privilege In China'S Socialist Market Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Ke Li
  • Russell Smyth
  • Shuntian Yao

Abstract

. This paper develops a general equilibrium model to consider the effects of corruption caused by institutionalized privilege on economic welfare, the network size of division of labour and productivity. First a Walrasian equilibrium in a market economy is computed; then we consider the effects on welfare when a privileged group is chosen to work as high‐level administrators. Finally, we allow for explicit collusion between administrators by introducing an administrator's agent who acts in the interests of all the administrators. The model shows that in equilibrium (fixed point) the degree of corruption, the degree of division of labour and productivity are interdependent.

Suggested Citation

  • Ke Li & Russell Smyth & Shuntian Yao, 2005. "Institutionalized Corruption And Privilege In China'S Socialist Market Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(3), pages 341-360, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:10:y:2005:i:3:p:341-360
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2005.00277.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2005.00277.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2005.00277.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wai-Man Liu & Xiaokai Yang, 2001. "Political Pluralism Versus Political Monopoly: Effects of Political Monopoly of the Ruling Elite on the Extent of the Market, Income Distribution, and Development," CID Working Papers 73A, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Xiaowei Zang, 2010. "Why Are the Elite in China Motivated to Promote Growth?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2010-084, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Xiaobing Wang, 2009. "Regulation and Corruption in Transitional China," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0920, Economics, The University of Manchester.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ke Li, 2006. "Division Of Labour, Specialization, And Theft Behavior — A General Equilibrium Analysis Of "Hobbes' Jungle"," Division of Labor & Transaction Costs (DLTC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(02), pages 163-184.
    2. Cheng, Wenli & Yang, Xiaokai, 2004. "Inframarginal analysis of division of labor: A survey," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 137-174, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:10:y:2005:i:3:p:341-360. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1361-374X .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.