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Equilibrium with Default and Endogenous Collateral

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  • Aloisio Ara�jo
  • Jaime Orrillo
  • Mario R. Páscoa

Abstract

We study a two-period general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and default. We make collateral endogenous by allowing each seller of assets to fix the level of collateral. Sellers are required to provide collateral whose first-period value, per unit of asset, exceeds the asset price by an arbitrarily small amount. Moreover, borrowers are also required to be fully covered by the purchase, in the first period, of state-by-state default insurance. These insurance contracts are offered by lenders. The insurance cost or revenue is a linear charge and plays the role of a spread penalizing borrowers who will incur in default and benefiting lenders who will suffer default. Under these assumptions, equilibrium always exists. Copyright Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 2000.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Mathematical Finance.

Volume (Year): 10 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-21

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Handle: RePEc:bla:mathfi:v:10:y:2000:i:1:p:1-21

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Cited by:
  1. Rubén Poblete-Cazenave & Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez, 2010. "Equilibrium with limited-recourse collateralized loans," Working Papers wp313, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
  2. Aloisio Araujo, 2002. "As Leis de Falência: uma Abordagem Econômica," Working Papers Series 57, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
  3. Jaime Jose Orrillo Carhuajulca, 2000. "Default and Exogenous Collateral in Incomplete Markets with a Continuum of States," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1860, Econometric Society.
  4. Mário Páscoa & Aloisio Araujo & José Fajardo, 2004. "Endogenous Collateral," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 161, Econometric Society.
  5. Aloísio Araújo & Susan Schommer & Michael Woodford, 2013. "Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy with Endogenous Collateral Constraints," NBER Working Papers 19711, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Páscoa, Mario Rui & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Barbachan, José Fajardo, 2001. "Endogenous Collateral: Arbitrage and Equilibrium without Bounded Short Sales," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 418, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  7. Madan, Dilip B., 2004. "Monitored financial equilibria," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 2213-2235, September.
  8. Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2014. "Prices and Investment with Collateral and Default," Working Papers 143, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  9. Jaime Luque, 2014. "Wages, local amenities and the rise of the multi-skilled city," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 457-467, March.
  10. Fajardo, Jose, 2005. "A note on arbitrage and exogenous collateral," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 336-341, November.
  11. Wooders, M. & Selten, R. & Cartwright, E., 2001. "Some First Results for Noncooperative Pregames : Social Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 589, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  12. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00195526 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Wooders, Myrna & Edward Cartwright & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Social Conformity And Equilibrium In Pure Strategies In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 636, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  14. Nuno Gouveia, 2004. "General equilibrium with asymmetric information and default penalties," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b05051, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised Jan 2005.

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