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Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Evidence From the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry

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  • Wen-Yen Hsu
  • Yenyu (Rebecca) Huang
  • Gene Lai

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="en"> This article examines the impact of board and finance committee characteristics on insurers' cash holdings using a sample of 1,454 U.S. stock property–liability insurer-year observations. We focus on the roles of independent board members and independent finance committee members. Our results suggest that independent board members allow managers to hold excess cash holdings to avoid underinvestment and play a monitoring role in managers' cash spending behavior in a regulated industry. The overall findings are consistent with the independent director responsibility hypothesis, which suggests that independent directors play a monitoring role in managers' cash spending behavior and avoiding underinvestment problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Wen-Yen Hsu & Yenyu (Rebecca) Huang & Gene Lai, 2015. "Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Evidence From the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 82(3), pages 715-748, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:82:y:2015:i:3:p:715-748
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    Cited by:

    1. Xin Che & Stephen G. Fier & Andre P. Liebenberg, 2019. "The effect of predation risk on cash holdings: Empirical evidence from the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(3), pages 329-358, September.
    2. Xie, Xiaoying & Wang, Yuling & Zhao, Guiqin & Lu, Weili, 2017. "Cash holdings between public and private insurers ‒ a partial adjustment approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 80-97.
    3. Mike Adams & Wei Jiang & Tianshu Ma, 2024. "CEO power, corporate risk management, and dividends: disentangling CEO managerial ability from entrenchment," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 683-717, February.
    4. Domenico Rocco Cambrea & Andrea Calabrò & Maurizio La Rocca & Francesco Paolone, 2022. "The impact of boards of directors’ characteristics on cash holdings in uncertain times," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 26(1), pages 189-221, March.
    5. Li, Weiping & Chen, Xiaoqi & Huang, Jiashun & Gong, Xu & Wu, Wei, 2022. "Do environmental regulations affect firm's cash holdings? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    6. Sangyong Han & Kwangmin Jung, 2023. "CEO political orientation, risk taking, and firm performance: evidence from the U.S. property-liability insurance industry," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 1-39, March.
    7. Berry-Stölzle, Thomas R. & Irlbeck, Steven, 2021. "Religiosity and risk taking: Is there a demand-side effect?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).

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