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Introduction to the special issue on markets, policies, and economic design: Theory and experiments

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  • Rabah Amir
  • Myrna Wooders

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  • Rabah Amir & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Introduction to the special issue on markets, policies, and economic design: Theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 765-771, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:23:y:2021:i:5:p:765-771
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12544
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Andrea Guido & Mathieu Lefebvre, 2021. "Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 1074-1101, October.
    2. Stefano Colombo & Siyu Ma & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2021. "Equivalence between fixed fee and ad valorem profit royalty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 1052-1073, October.
    3. David R. Collie, 2019. "Taxation under oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(4), pages 738-753, August.
    4. Guy Meunier & Ingmar Schumacher, 2020. "The importance of considering optimal government policy when social norms matter for the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 630-655, June.
    5. Rohan Dutta & David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 858-894, October.
    6. Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A., 2016. "Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 219-234.
    7. Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth D. Myles & Hana Yousefi, 2021. "Household tax evasion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 985-1011, October.
    8. Horn‐In Kuo & Cheng‐Hau Peng & K. L. Glen Ueng, 2021. "On the Neutrality of Profit Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 1012-1021, October.
    9. Lisa Windsteiger, 2021. "Monopolistic supply of sorting, inequality, and welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 801-821, October.
    10. Armando Gomes, 2020. "Valuations and dynamics of negotiations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 245-273, February.
    11. Rémy Oddou, 2020. "The effect of a progressive taxation scheme on the endogenous formation of jurisdictions," Post-Print hal-02908433, HAL.
    12. Carlos Bethencourt & Lars Kunze, 2019. "Tax evasion, social norms, and economic growth," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(2), pages 332-346, April.
    13. Remy Oddou, 2020. "The effect of a progressive taxation scheme on the endogenous formation of jurisdictions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1705-1712, September.
    14. Giuseppe Attanasi & Samuele Centorrino & Elena Manzoni, 2021. "Zero‐intelligence versus human agents: An experimental analysis of the efficiency of Double Auctions and Over‐the‐Counter markets of varying sizes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 895-932, October.
    15. Tim Groseclose, 2021. "One‐sided bargaining over a finite set of alternatives," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 933-957, October.
    16. Philipp J. H. Schröder & Allan Sørensen, 2021. "Specific taxation, asymmetric costs, and endogenous quality," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 1022-1051, October.
    17. Christos Kotsogiannis & Miguel‐Angel Lopez‐Garcia, 2021. "On commodity tax harmonization and public goods provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1220-1227, December.
    18. Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum, 2020. "Equilibrium opacity in ultimatum‐offer bargaining," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1515-1529, September.
    19. Stefano Barbieri & Iryna Topolyan, 2021. "Private‐information group contests with complementarities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 772-800, October.
    20. Alexander Zimper & Mpoifeng Molefinyane, 2021. "Bargaining over loan contracts with signaling," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 958-984, October.
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