Volker H. Hoffmann Thomas Trautmann Jens Hamprecht
Abstract
There is a polarity in the literature as to whether companies do or do not postpone investment decisions in the light of regulatory uncertainty. In the case of flexible regulation characterized by a high degree and discontinuous resolution of uncertainty, we show that companies do not necessarily postpone investment decisions. We trace this observation back to three motivations: securing competitive resources, leveraging complementary resources, and alleviating institutional pressure. We connect these motivations to fundamental principles of the resource-based view and institutional theory and further show the existence of a regime where institutionally motivated and resource-based actions are not necessarily decoupled. We base our research on a case study covering 80 per cent of the German power generation industry which faces regulatory uncertainty from the European CO2 Emission Trading Scheme. Copyright (c) Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009.
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Volume (Year): 46 (2009) Issue (Month): 7 (November) Pages: 1227-1253 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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