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Option Value to Waiting Created by a Control Problem

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  • Anil Arya
  • Jonathan Glover

Abstract

We study a principal‐agent model in which there is an option to defer a capital project approval decision. A control (incentive) problem makes the option to wait valuable when it would not have been valuable otherwise. Deferring the project approval decision has both a cost and a benefit. The cost of waiting is that the agent’s uncertainty regarding future project cost realizations cannot be exploited. However, by delaying the first project’s approval decision, the principal can condition its approval on the agent’s cost report of the second project. Such conditioning can be valuable in the provision of incentives because of a diversification effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover, 2001. "Option Value to Waiting Created by a Control Problem," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3), pages 405-415, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:39:y:2001:i:3:p:405-415
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.00019
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    Cited by:

    1. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016. "How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 61-88, February.
    2. Nicole Bastian Johnson & Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2013. "Multistage Capital Budgeting for Shared Investments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(5), pages 1213-1228, May.
    3. Nikias, Anthony D. & Schwartz, Steven T. & Young, Richard A., 2009. "A note on bundling budgets to achieve management control," Journal of Accounting Education, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 168-184.
    4. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016. "How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57, pages 61-88, February.
    5. Dmitry Livdan & Alexander Nezlobin, 2017. "Accounting rules, equity valuation, and growth options," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 1122-1155, September.
    6. Sanjay Kallapur & Leslie Eldenburg, 2005. "Uncertainty, Real Options, and Cost Behavior: Evidence from Washington State Hospitals," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(5), pages 735-752, December.
    7. Clemens Löffler & Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2013. "The irreversibility effect and agency conflicts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 219-239, February.
    8. Livdan, Dmitry & Nezlobin, Alexander, 2022. "Incentivizing irreversible investment," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 110531, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Barbara Harreiter & Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2007. "Are real options more valuable in the presence of agency conflicts?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 185-207, November.
    10. Brian Mittendorf, 2004. "Information Revelation, Incentives, and the Value of a Real Option," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(12), pages 1638-1645, December.
    11. Löffler, Clemens & Pfeiffer, Thomas & Schneider, Georg, 2012. "Controlling for supplier switching in the presence of real options and asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(3), pages 690-700.
    12. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2006. "Project Assignments When Budget Padding Taints Resource Allocation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(9), pages 1345-1358, September.
    13. Madhav V. Rajan & Stefan Reichelstein, 2004. "ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE: A Perspective on ÜAsymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource AllocationÝ," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(12), pages 1615-1623, December.
    14. Nicole Bastian Johnson & Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2017. "Two-stage capital budgeting, capital charge rates, and resource constraints," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 933-963, June.
    15. Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2007. "Residual Income-Based Compensation Plans for Controlling Investment Decisions Under Sequential Private Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(3), pages 495-507, March.

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