Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Financial Expertise as an Arms Race

Contents:

Author Info

  • VINCENT GLODE
  • RICHARD C. GREEN
  • RICHARD LOWERY

Abstract

We propose a model in which firms involved in trading securities overinvest in financial expertise. Intermediaries or traders in the model meet and bargain over a financial asset. As in the bargaining model in Dang (2008), counterparties endogenously decide whether to acquire information, and improve their bargaining positions, even though the information creates adverse selection. We add to this setting the concept of "financial expertise" as resources invested to lower the cost of later acquiring information about the value of the asset being traded. These investments are made before the parties know about their role in the bargaining game, as proposer or responder, buyer or seller. A prisoner's dilemma arises because investments to lower information acquisition costs improve bargaining outcomes given the other party's information costs, even though the information has no social benefit. These investments lead to breakdowns in trade, or liquidity crises, in response to random but infrequent increases in asset volatility

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01771.x
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 67 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 1723-1759

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:67:y:2012:i:5:p:1723-1759

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.afajof.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ashenfelter, O. & Bloom, D., 1990. "Lawyers As Agents Of The Devil In A Prisoner'S Dilemma Game," Papers 57, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  2. Robert Hauswald & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 967-1000.
  3. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Overinvestment in financial expertise
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-09-29 14:35:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. repec:dgr:uvatin:2013032 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Lei Zhang & Hanno Lustig & Andrea Eisfeldt, 2013. "Financial Expertise and Asset Prices," 2013 Meeting Papers 1347, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Kartik Anand & James Chapman & Prasanna Gai, 2012. "Covered bonds, core markets, and financial stability," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2012-065, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  4. Marco Di Maggio & Marco Pagano, 2012. "Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing," EIEF Working Papers Series 1212, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2014.
  5. Biais, Bruno & Foucault, Thierry & Moinas, Sophie, 2013. "Equilibrium Fast Trading," Les Cahiers de Recherche 968, HEC Paris.
  6. Donnelly, Catherine & Guillén, Montserrat & Nielsen, Jens Perch, 2014. "Bringing cost transparency to the life annuity market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 14-27.
  7. Garvey, John & Gallagher, Liam A., 2013. "The economics of data: Using simple model-free volatility in a high-frequency world," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 370-379.
  8. Patrick Bolton & Tano Santos & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2011. "Cream Skimming in Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 16804, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Eden, Maya, 2012. "Should Wall-Street be occupied ? an overlooked price externality of financial intermediation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6059, The World Bank.
  10. Philip Bond & Yaron Leitner, 2013. "Market run-ups, market freezes, inventories, and leverage," Working Papers 13-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, revised 04 Feb 2014.
  11. Thomas Philippon, 2012. "Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation," NBER Working Papers 18077, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
  1. Economic Logic blog

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:67:y:2012:i:5:p:1723-1759. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.