Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value, and the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936 and 1937
AbstractIn 1936, the federal government unexpectedly imposed a tax on undistributed corporate profits. Despite the direct costs of the tax, its announcement produced a positive revaluation of corporate equity, particularly among lower-payout firms. The authors interpret this as evidence of a divergence between managerial and shareholder preferences regarding dividend payout policies, consistent with the presence of agency costs. They also find that, despite the incentives created by the tax, the actual growth in dividends during 1936 was lower among firms judged more likely to be subject to higher agency costs after controlling for liquidity, debt, and the growth in earnings. Copyright 1994 by American Finance Association.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 49 (1994)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2010. "Dividend and Corporate Taxation in an Agency Model of the Firm," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 1-31, August.
- Aivazian, Varouj & Booth, Laurence & Cleary, Sean, 2003. "Dividend policy and the organization of capital markets," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 101-121, April.
- Pennings, Joost M. E., 2004. "A marketing-finance approach towards industrial channel contract relationships: a model and application," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 57(6), pages 601-609, June.
- Desai, Mihir A. & Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2007.
"Theft and taxes,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 591-623, June.
- Mihir A. Desai & Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2003. "Theft and Taxes," International Tax Program Papers 0501, International Tax Program, Institute for International Business, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, revised Dec 2004.
- Mihir A. Desai & Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2004. "Theft and Taxes," NBER Working Papers 10978, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Desai, Mihir & Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2004. "Theft and Taxes," CEPR Discussion Papers 4816, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- John R. Graham & Sonali Hazarika & Krishnamoorthy Narasimhan, 2011. "Financial Distress in the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 17388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.