Strategic Entry Deterrence: Recent Developments in the Economics of Industry
AbstractThis paper reviews the recent developments in the economics of industry with respect to strategic entry deterrence. Starting from Bain's (1956) classical analysis, a simple two-stage game between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant is used to present the general structure of the entry deterrence problem. Commitments, credible threat and sub-game perfection are illustrated in this context. The various strategic variables that an incumbent firm can use to bar entry are discussed. The issue of whether a group of incumbents can noncooperatively deter entry is taken up and some empirical evidence is reviewed. Copyright 1989 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.
Volume (Year): 3 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0950-0804
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- Miguel Flores, 2011. "24/7," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/51, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
- Michael Kopel & Clemens Löffler, 2008. "Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 143-166, July.
- Tombak, Mihkel M., 1995. "Process technologies, learning and brand proliferation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 26-38, April.
- Dawid, Herbert & Kopel, Michael & Kort, Peter M., 2010. "Innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 203-222, August.
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