Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage

Contents:

Author Info

  • Michael Kopel

    ()

  • Clemens Löffler

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00712-008-0004-4
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 94 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 143-166

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:94:y:2008:i:2:p:143-166

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909

Related research

Keywords: First mover advantage; Strategic delegation; Research and development; L13; L2; O31;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Michael Kopel & Christian Riegler, 2006. "R&D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(7), pages 605-612.
  2. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
  3. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
  4. Luca Lambertini, 1996. "Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition," Working Papers 267, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  5. Jansen, Thijs & van Lier, Arie & van Witteloostuijn, Arjen, 2007. "A note on strategic delegation: The market share case," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 531-539, June.
  6. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  7. Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 459-464, October.
  8. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 225-235, Spring.
  9. Jianbo Zhang & Zhentang Zhang, 1997. "R&D in a strategic delegation game," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 391-398.
  10. Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
  11. Fershtman, Chaim, 1985. "Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 245-253, June.
  12. Amir, Rabah & Stepanova, Anna, 2006. "Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, April.
  13. Polo, Michele & Tedeschi, Piero, 2000. "Delegation games and side-contracting," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 101-116, March.
  14. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-59, August.
  15. Matthias Kräkel, 2004. "R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 147-156.
  16. Neven, Damien J, 1989. " Strategic Entry Deterrence: Recent Developments in the Economics of Industry," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 213-33.
  17. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Dixon, Huw, 1985. "Strategic Investment in an Industry with a Competitive Product Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 483-99, June.
  19. Zhiyong Liu, 2005. "Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(5), pages 345-350.
  20. Ware, Roger, 1984. "Sunk Costs and Strategic Commitment: A Proposed Three-Stage Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 370-78, June.
  21. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-53, October.
  22. Vardy, Felix, 2004. "The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 374-400, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kopel, Michael & Brand, Björn, 2012. "Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 982-989.
  2. Nie, Pu-yan, 2013. "Duopoly quality commitment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 832-842.
  3. Michael Kopel & Marco A. Marini, 2012. "Optimal Compensation Structure in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly," DIS Technical Reports 2012-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
  4. Athanasia Mavrommati, 2012. "A stackelberg duopoly with binary choices of objectives," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 843-853.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:94:y:2008:i:2:p:143-166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.