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Stakeholder Mobilization in Financial Regulation: A Comparison of EU Regulatory Politics over Time

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  • Bastiaan Redert

Abstract

Current scholarship is inconclusive whether stakeholder involvement in regulatory politics can be legitimizing. This article argues that stakeholder involvement can only be legitimizing if bias in mobilization is limited. As bias is limited if a heterogeneous set of stakeholders participates, stakeholder mobilization in public consultations on EU financial regulation is examined. Due to the financial crisis and subsequent institutional reforms, stakeholders' perception on who is affected by regulation and the reach of the agencies' operations has changed. Subsequently, mobilization is expected to be more heterogenous. The analysis is based on a novel dataset of stakeholder responses to public consultations of the European Supervisory Authorities before and after the financial crisis and reforms. The results show shifts in interest mobilization, but these do not follow the research expectations. Therefore, the findings show that public consultations do not necessarily decrease bias. As such, consultations show important limits for legitimizing EU regulatory policies.

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  • Bastiaan Redert, 2020. "Stakeholder Mobilization in Financial Regulation: A Comparison of EU Regulatory Politics over Time," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(6), pages 1433-1451, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:58:y:2020:i:6:p:1433-1451
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13046
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    References listed on IDEAS

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