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Structure, Capacity or Power? Explaining Salience in EU Decision-Making

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  • Dirk Leuffen
  • Thomas Malang
  • Sebastian Wörle

Abstract

Salience as the intensity of interest is a key explanatory factor of European Union decision-making. In this article, the ability of three explanatory models to explain the realized values of Member States’ salience is hypothesized and tested. On the basis of the DEU II data, the analysis shows that a mixture of national interest group heterogeneity and membership length has the highest predictive power. The results support the liberal intergovernmentalist claim that domestic interests determine European decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Leuffen & Thomas Malang & Sebastian Wörle, 2014. "Structure, Capacity or Power? Explaining Salience in EU Decision-Making," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 616-631, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:52:y:2014:i:3:p:616-631
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jcms.12100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Wasserfallen & Dirk Leuffen & Zdenek Kudrna & Hanno Degner, 2019. "Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 3-23, March.
    2. Austė Vaznonytė, 2020. "The rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU – Still an agenda-setter?," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 497-518, September.
    3. Thomas Malang & Katharina Holzinger, 2020. "The political economy of differentiated integration: The case of common agricultural policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 741-766, July.
    4. Iskander De Bruycker, 2016. "Pressure and Expertise: Explaining the Information Supply of Interest Groups in EU Legislative Lobbying," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 599-616, May.
    5. Javier Arregui, 2016. "Determinants of Bargaining Satisfaction Across Policy Domains in the European Union Council of Ministers," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(5), pages 1105-1122, September.

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