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Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces

Author

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  • Sascha Kurz

    (Department of Mathematics, University of Bayreuth, Universitätsstr. 30, Bayreuth D-95440, Germany)

Abstract

Classical power index analysis considers the individual’s ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either “yes” or “no”. Here we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the analysis of a collection of economic problems like, e.g., tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be covered in binary models.

Suggested Citation

  • Sascha Kurz, 2014. "Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces," Economies, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-33, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jecomi:v:2:y:2014:i:1:p:45-77:d:33777
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sascha Kurz, 2016. "The inverse problem for power distributions in committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 65-88, June.
    2. Sascha Kurz & Issofa Moyouwou & Hilaire Touyem, 2021. "Axiomatizations for the Shapley–Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 569-594, April.
    3. Sascha Kurz, 2018. "Importance In Systems With Interval Decisions," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 21(06n07), pages 1-23, September.
    4. Friedman, Jane & Parker, Cameron, 2018. "The conditional Shapley–Shubik measure for ternary voting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 379-390.

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