IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/etrans/v13y2005i3p427-443.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic development and the decline of rural and urban community‐based networks

Author

Listed:
  • Kaivan Munshi
  • Mark Rosenzweig

Abstract

This paper studies how traditional networks in rural and urban India have responded to economic development. In rural areas, the impact of the Green Revolution on within‐network inequality has resulted in defection by the wealthiest members of caste‐based social insurance networks. In Bombay, the most able members of the caste‐based labour market networks are exiting from the traditional occupations to participate in new occupations in which individual rather than group ability is rewarded. In both cases, the weakest members of the community are left in networks that now have lowered capacity to provide services.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2005. "Economic development and the decline of rural and urban community‐based networks," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 13(3), pages 427-443, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:13:y:2005:i:3:p:427-443
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00231.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00231.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00231.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(1), pages 209-244.
    2. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Andrew F. Newman, 1998. "Information, the Dual Economy, and Development," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(4), pages 631-653.
    3. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-591, May.
    4. Christopher Udry, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in Northern Nigeria," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 495-526.
    5. La Ferrara, Eliana, 2002. "Inequality and group participation: theory and evidence from rural Tanzania," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 235-273, August.
    6. Atkeson, Andrew & Ogaki, Masao, 1996. "Wealth-varying intertemporal elasticities of substitution: Evidence from panel and aggregate data," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 507-534, December.
    7. Gersovitz, Mark, 1983. "Savings and Nutrition at Low Incomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 841-855, October.
    8. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    9. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ke Xu & Xianli Xia, 2023. "The Influence of Farmers’ Clan Networks on Their Participation in Living Environment Improvement during the Time of Transition in Traditional Rural China," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-22, May.
    2. Ghani, Ejaz & Kerr, William & O'Connell, Stephen, 2013. "Promoting Women’s Economic Participation in India," World Bank - Economic Premise, The World Bank, issue 107, pages 1-6, February.
    3. Irac, D. & Minoiu, C., 2006. "Risk Insurance in a Transition Economy: Evidence from Rural Romania," Working papers 154, Banque de France.
    4. Li, Qi & Li, Kai, 2021. "Re-examining the Effect of Social Embeddedness on Technology Diffusion from the Perspective of Scale Differentiation— A Case Study from China," 2021 ASAE 10th International Conference (Virtual), January 11-13, Beijing, China 329394, Asian Society of Agricultural Economists (ASAE).
    5. Kleemans, Marieke, 2015. "Migration Choice under Risk and Liquidity Constraints," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 200702, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    6. Delphine M. Irac & Camelia Minoiu, 2007. "Risk insurance in a transition economy," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 15(1), pages 153-173, January.
    7. Abdulla, Kanat, 2019. "Productivity gains from reallocation of talent in Brazil and India," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    8. Arindam Samaddar & Prabir Das, 2008. "Changes in transition: technology adoption and rice farming in two Indian villages," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer;The Agriculture, Food, & Human Values Society (AFHVS), vol. 25(4), pages 541-553, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kaivan Munshi & Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2005. "Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social Insurance, Inequality, and Growth," CID Working Papers 121, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    2. Di Falco, Salvatore & Feri, Francesco & Pin, Paolo & Vollenweider, Xavier, 2018. "Ties that bind: Network redistributive pressure and economic decisions in village economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 123-131.
    3. Attila Ambrus & Markus Mobius & Adam Szeidl, 2014. "Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 149-182, January.
    4. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2016. "Networks and Misallocation: Insurance, Migration, and the Rural-Urban Wage Gap," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(1), pages 46-98, January.
    5. Melanie Morten, 2016. "Temporary Migration and Endogenous Risk Sharing in Village India," NBER Working Papers 22159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Mazzucato, Valentina, 2009. "Informal Insurance Arrangements in Ghanaian Migrants' Transnational Networks: The Role of Reverse Remittances and Geographic Proximity," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1105-1115, June.
    7. Juan M. Gallego & Mariapia Mendola, 2013. "Labour Migration and Social Networks Participation in Southern Mozambique," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 80(320), pages 721-759, October.
    8. Mobarak, A. Mushfiq & Rosenzweig, Mark R., 2012. "Selling formal Insurance to the Informally Insured," Center Discussion Papers 121671, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    9. Tessa Bold, 2009. "Implications of Endogenous Group Formation for Efficient Risk‐Sharing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 562-591, March.
    10. Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Kin Groups and Reciprocity: A Model of Credit Transactions in Ghana," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1730-1751, December.
    11. Gutierrez, Federico H., 2014. "Acute morbidity and labor outcomes in Mexico: Testing the role of labor contracts as an income smoothing mechanism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-12.
    12. Wang, Ruixin, 2016. "Who Should I Share Risk with? Gifts can tell : Theory and Evidence from Rural China," Other publications TiSEM 95c6dbed-3f49-4d5a-987e-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Gary Charness & Garance Genicot, 2009. "Informal Risk Sharing in an Infinite‐Horizon Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 796-825, April.
    14. Orazio P. Attanasio & Guglielmo Weber, 2010. "Consumption and Saving: Models of Intertemporal Allocation and Their Implications for Public Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 693-751, September.
    15. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.
    16. Jonathan Robinson, 2012. "Limited Insurance within the Household: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 140-164, October.
    17. Tessa Bold & Stefan Dercon, 2009. "Contract Design in Insurance Groups," CSAE Working Paper Series 2009-04, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    18. Zimmerman, Frederick J. & Carter, Michael R., 2003. "Asset smoothing, consumption smoothing and the reproduction of inequality under risk and subsistence constraints," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 233-260, August.
    19. Gulesci,Selim, 2020. "Poverty Alleviation and Interhousehold Transfers : Evidence from BRAC's Graduation Program in Bangladesh," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9467, The World Bank.
    20. Paan Jindapon & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta & Ajalavat Viriyavipart, 2022. "Income Interdependence and Informal Risk Sharing Under the Shadow of the Future," PIER Discussion Papers 191, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:13:y:2005:i:3:p:427-443. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ebrdduk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.