Minority Expropriation and Shareholder Activism Following Olivetti's Hostile Takeover of Telecom Italia
AbstractI examine the treatment of minority shareholders and shareholder activism following Olivetti's successful hostile acquisition of a majority stake in Telecom Italia in 1999. Overall, the evidence is mixed. While Olivetti pursued several operations perceived to be detrimental to Telecom Italia's minority shareholders, they were atypically vigorous in fighting back. In several cases, Olivetti was forced to abandon or improve the terms of the operations. While Telecom Italia was vulnerable to a hostile takeover attack following its privatisation, the concentration of ownership of listed companies ensures that hostile takeovers will remain rare. Moreover, low participation rates at annual meetings among small investors serves to enhance the power of the controlling blocks. Copyright (c) 2007 The Author; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Corporate Governance: An International Review.
Volume (Year): 15 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0964-8410&site=1
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- Siti Sakinah Azizan & Rashid Ameer, 2012. "Shareholder activism in family-controlled firms in Malaysia," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 27(8), pages 774-794.
- Michele Meoli & Stefano Paleari & Giovanni Urga, 2008. "Controlling shareholders and minority protection: governance lessons from the case of Telecom Italia," Working Papers 0808, Department of Economics and Technology Management, University of Bergamo.
- Andrea Melis & Silvia Carta & Silvia Gaia, 2012. "Executive remuneration in blockholder-dominated firms. How do Italian firms use stock options?," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 511-541, August.
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