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Union-Firm Interaction and the Right to Manage

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  • Dobson, Paul W

Abstract

In the context of price-setting oligopoly, this paper shows that there may be consensus in union-employer bargaining for limiting the scope of bargaining to determining wage levels and allowing the employer to act unilaterally when competing in the product market. A strategic commitment by each union-firm pair to a right-to-manage framework, rather than a participatory approach, may benefit the bargaining parties since this entails higher negotiated wage rates which, by dampening competition in the product market, may allow for an increase in the amount of surplus generated by the parties. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Bulletin of Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 49 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 213-29

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Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:49:y:1997:i:3:p:213-29

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0307-3378

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Cited by:
  1. Christian Merkl & Dennis J. Snower, 2005. "Monetary Persistence, Imperfect Competition, and Staggering Complementarities," Kiel Working Papers 1257, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  2. George Symeonidis, 2007. "Downstream Competition, Bargaining and Welfare," Economics Discussion Papers, University of Essex, Department of Economics 625, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  3. Julia Müller & Thorsten Upmann, 2013. "Centralised Labour Market Negotiations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4470, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Pohl, Hartmut, 1998. "Beziehungsspezifische Investitionen und Form des Verhandlungsprozesses," Discussion Papers, Series I 293, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  5. George Symeonidis, 2009. "Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Papers, University of Essex, Department of Economics 671, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  6. Pohl, Hartmut, 1998. "Die Rolle von Arbeitsmärkten bei der Qualitätsauswahl in vertikal differenzierten Märkten," Discussion Papers, Series I 292, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  7. Dobson, Paul W. & Waterson, Michael, 2007. "The competition effects of industry-wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 935-962, October.

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