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Financial distress and non‐executive director compensation: Evidence from state‐owned enterprises in South Africa post King III

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  • Abraham Simon Otim Emuron
  • Tian Yixiang

Abstract

Using a sample of South African state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), we examine the pre‐ and post‐period impact of King III on non‐executive director (NED) compensation with emphasis on financially distressed SOEs. This paper adopts a difference‐in‐differences analysis technique with repeated measures as the basis for testing the hypotheses. The revised Altman Z‐score model which incorporates features unique to emerging markets is used to measure financial distress. Our findings indicate that SOEs that adopted King III will increase NED compensation when the firm has a positive performance and will severely penalize NED when the firm faces financial distress. This study highlights the importance of well‐crafted corporate governance policies. It further sheds light on the importance of King III and how its implementation may prove vital for the success of an enterprise.

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  • Abraham Simon Otim Emuron & Tian Yixiang, 2020. "Financial distress and non‐executive director compensation: Evidence from state‐owned enterprises in South Africa post King III," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 32(2), pages 228-239, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:afrdev:v:32:y:2020:i:2:p:228-239
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8268.12430
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