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Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes

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  • Flinn, Christopher J

Abstract

The author develops and estimates an equilibrium model of the labor market in which inefficient employees are systematically eliminated from the sector of the market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard. Systematic selection on the distribution of productivity characteristics produces wage sequences which are increasing in tenure for employees never previously terminated even in the absence of long-term contracting between employees and individual firms. The author provides sufficient conditions for there to exist an unique termination-contract type equilibrium and he estimates the equilibrium model using micro-level data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Statistical Association in its journal Journal of Business and Economic Statistics.

Volume (Year): 15 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 221-36

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Handle: RePEc:bes:jnlbes:v:15:y:1997:i:2:p:221-36

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Cited by:
  1. Sauer, Robert & Keane, Michael P., 2007. "A computationally practical simulation estimation algorithm for dynamic panel data models with unobserved endogenous state variables," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0705, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  2. Demiralp, Berna, 2007. "Occupational Self-Selection in a Labor Market with Moral Hazard," MPRA Paper 2314, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Flinn, Christopher, 2003. "Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search with Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 949, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Ziesemer,Thomas, 2001. "Contract Prolongation In Innovation Production As A Principal-Agent Problem With Moral Hazard," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
  5. C. J. Flinn, . "Interpreting Minimum Wage Effects on Wage Distributions: A Cautionary Tale," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1214-00, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.

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