Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes
AbstractThe author develops and estimates an equilibrium model of the labor market in which inefficient employees are systematically eliminated from the sector of the market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard. Systematic selection on the distribution of productivity characteristics produces wage sequences which are increasing in tenure for employees never previously terminated even in the absence of long-term contracting between employees and individual firms. The author provides sufficient conditions for there to exist an unique termination-contract type equilibrium and he estimates the equilibrium model using micro-level data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Statistical Association in its journal Journal of Business and Economic Statistics.
Volume (Year): 15 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.amstat.org/publications/jbes/index.cfm?fuseaction=main
Other versions of this item:
- Flinn, C.J., 1993. "Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes," Working Papers 93-38, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Flinn, Christopher J., 1991. "Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes," Working Papers 91-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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- Ziesemer,Thomas, 2001. "Contract Prolongation In Innovation Production As A Principal-Agent Problem With Moral Hazard," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
- Sauer, Robert & Keane, Michael P., 2007.
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Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
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- Michael P. Keane & Robert M. Sauer, 2010. "A Computationally Practical Simulation Estimation Algorithm for Dynamic Panel Data Models with Unobserved Endogenous State Variables," Working Papers 1008, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 05 Jul 2010.
- Keane, Michael P. & Sauer, Robert M., 2009. "A Computationally Practical Simulation Estimation Algorithm for Dynamic Panel Data Models with Unobserved Endogenous State Variables," IZA Discussion Papers 4054, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Robert M. Sauer & Michael P. Keane, 2004. "A Computationally Practical Simulation Estimation Algorithm for Dynamic Panel Data Models with Unobserved Endogenous State Variables," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 136, Econometric Society.
- Demiralp, Berna, 2007.
"Occupational Self-Selection in a Labor Market with Moral Hazard,"
2314, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Demiralp, Berna, 2011. "Occupational self-selection in a labor market with moral hazard," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 497-519, May.
- C. J. Flinn, .
"Interpreting Minimum Wage Effects on Wage Distributions: A Cautionary Tale,"
Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers
1214-00, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
- Christopher J. FLINN, 2002. "Interpreting Minimum Wage Effects on Wage Distributions : A Cautionary Tale," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 67-68, pages 309-355.
- Christopher J. Flinn, 2000. "Interpreting minimum wage effects on wage distribution: a cautionary tale," ICER Working Papers 05-2000, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research, revised May 2000.
- Flinn, C. J., 2000. "Interpreting Minimum Wage Effects on Wage Distributions: A Cautionary Tale," Working Papers 00-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Flinn, Christopher, 2003. "Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search with Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 949, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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