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Competition Policy and Concentration of a Globalized Retail Industry

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Author Info
Stéphane Caprice
Vanessa von Schlippenbach
Abstract

During the last decades the face of retailing has changed as a result of an ongoing concentration process and the emergence of increasingly large-scale retail outlets. Retailers constitute, therefore, “strategic gatekeepers” to final consumer markets providing them with buyer power vis-à-vis their suppliers. By preventing market entry, existing retail regulations have further strengthened the dominant position of retailers. In order to overcome the potential abuse of buyer power and thus to circumvent the induced inefficiencies, competition among retailers has to be encouraged. This gains in importance since the retail sector is also characterized by a strong internationalization process affecting both the worldwide spread of retail companies as well as their procurement strategies. In this regard, downstream competition is the only way to compensate the missing global legislation and jurisdiction.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Duncker & Humblot, Berlin in its journal Applied Economics Quarterly.

Volume (Year): 54 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 183-202
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Handle: RePEc:aeq:aeqaeq:v54_y2008_i3_q3_p183-202

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Web page: http://www.duncker-humblot.de

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Related research
Keywords: buyer power; retail regulation; globalization;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.


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