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Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies

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  • John M. Litwack
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    Abstract

    The classical Soviet-type system operates in the virtual absence of economic legality, which is a prerequisite to a successful transition to a market economy in the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe. In the absence of economic legality, the leadership of these countries will not be able to implement a credible commitment to private property rights or any other effective market incentive mechanism. In addition, they will be unable to promote the growth of multilateral impersonal trade. Without legality, a shift away from central planning toward market allocation may very likely lead to economic decline, inflationary pressures, and a polarization in income distribution, which, in turn, could unleash political reaction against the reform process in general.

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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.5.4.77
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

    Volume (Year): 5 (1991)
    Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
    Pages: 77-89

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    Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:5:y:1991:i:4:p:77-89

    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.5.4.77
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    Cited by:
    1. Roland, Gérard & Sekkat, M. Khalid, 1996. "Managerial Career Concerns, Privatization and Restructuring in Transition Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 1363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Che, Jiahua & Qian, Yingyi, 1998. "Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 1-23, April.
    3. John Tomer, 2002. "Intangible Factors in the Eastern European Transition: A Socio-Economic Analysis," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 421-444.
    4. Jeffrey B. Miller & Stoyan Tenev, 2005. "State and Ownership Reforms in Transition Economics: China vs. the Orthodoxy," Working Papers 05-10, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
    5. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 796-817, December.
    6. Christoph Bühler & Dirk Konietzka, 2008. "The transition from school to work in Russia during and after socialism: change or continuity?," MPIDR Working Papers WP-2008-018, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany.
    7. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 945-83, July.
    8. Jiang, Crystal X. & Yang, Qin & Li, Sali & Wang, Yong, 2011. "The moderating effect of foreign direct investment intensity on local firms' intangible resources investment and performance implications: A case from China," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 291-302.
    9. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2008. "Tournaments and Managerial Incentives in China's Listed Firms: New Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3730, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    10. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1914, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    11. Neary, Hugh M., 2001. "Dynamic consistency in incentive planning with a material input," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 315-332, March.
    12. Li, Yuan & Wei, Zelong & Zhao, Jie & Zhang, Chenlu & Liu, Yi, 2013. "Ambidextrous organizational learning, environmental munificence and new product performance: Moderating effect of managerial ties in China," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 95-105.
    13. Son Ku Kim & Keunkwan Ryu, 2001. "Joint Determination of Internal Organizational Design: Decision-Making, Task Allocation, and Incentive Scheme," ISER Discussion Paper 0550, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    14. Ofer, Gur, 2010. "Twenty Years Later and the Socialist Heritage is still Kicking: the Case of Russia," Working Paper Series wp2010-59, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    15. Grogan, Louise & Moers, Luc, 2001. "Growth empirics with institutional measures for transition countries," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 323-344, December.
    16. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, 2006. "Instituciones, recesiones y recuperación en las economías en transición," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 8(15), pages 43-68, July-Dece.

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