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Active Investors, Passive Investors, and Common Ownership

Author

Listed:
  • Oz Shy
  • Rune Stenbacka

Abstract

Recent studies have extensively examined the hypothesis that a higher degree of common ownership relaxes competition. This approach has typically conducted comparative statics analysis based on exogenously given rates of common ownership. This study constructs a simple model in which common ownership emerges as an equilibrium outcome resulting from ownership acquisition. We characterize the equilibrium incentives of institutional owners to acquire common ownership of the firms operating in a duopolistic product market. Further, we explore the effects of common ownership on passive investors, consumer welfare, and total welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2020. "Active Investors, Passive Investors, and Common Ownership," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 110, pages 565-568, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:110:y:2020:p:565-68
    DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20201028
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    Cited by:

    1. Stenbacka, Rune & Van Moer, Geert, 2021. "Cross ownership and divestment incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    2. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2020. "Common ownership, institutional investors, and welfare," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 706-723, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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