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Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Sweden

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  • David Seim

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical assessment of an annual wealth tax. Using Swedish administrative data, I estimate net-of-tax-rate elasticities of taxable wealth in the range [0.09, 0.27]. Cross-checking self-reported assets against asset data unavailable to the tax agency reveals that around a third of the elasticity estimates are due to underreporting of asset values. Difference-in-difference designs further suggest that the responses reflect evasion and avoidance rather than changes in saving.

Suggested Citation

  • David Seim, 2017. "Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Sweden," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 395-421, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:9:y:2017:i:4:p:395-421
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150290
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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