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Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

Author

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  • Bnaya Dreyfuss
  • Ori Heffetz
  • Matthew Rabin

Abstract

Deferred acceptance (DA), a widely implemented algorithm, is meant to improve allocations: under classical preferences, it induces preference-concordant rankings. However, recent evidence shows that—in both real, large-stakes applications and experiments—participants frequently play seemingly dominated, significantly costly strategies that avoid small chances of good outcomes. We show theoretically why, with expectations-based loss aversion, this behavior may be partly intentional. Reanalyzing existing experimental data on random serial dictatorship (a restriction of DA), we show that such reference-dependent preferences, with a degree and distribution of loss aversion that explain common levels of risk aversion elsewhere, fit the data better than no-loss-aversion preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Bnaya Dreyfuss & Ori Heffetz & Matthew Rabin, 2022. "Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 515-555, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:515-55
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200259
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Timm Opitz & Christoph Schwaiger, 2023. "Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 388, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    2. Emil Chrisander & Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen, 2023. "Why Do Students Lie and Should We Worry? An Analysis of Non-truthful Reporting," Papers 2302.13718, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    3. Kelvin Mashisia Shikuku & Erwin Bulte & Carl Johan Lagerkvist & Nhuong Tran, 2023. "Endowments, expectations, and the value of food safety certification: experimental evidence from fish markets in Nigeria," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1060-1084, November.
    4. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Schmacker, Renke & Terrier, Camille, 2022. "Confidence and college applications: Evidence from a randomized intervention," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2022-209, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2023. "Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    6. Leontiou, Anastasia & Manalis, Georgios & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Bandwagons in costly elections: The role of loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 471-490.
    7. Shengwu Li, 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms," Papers 2403.18694, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    8. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Flip Klijn & Marc Vorsatz, 2023. "Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 587-624, October.
    9. Bnaya Dreyfuss & Ofer Glicksohn & Ori Heffetz & Assaf Romm, 2022. "Deferred Acceptance with News Utility," NBER Working Papers 30635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Karle, Heiko & Schumacher, Heiner & Vølund, Rune, 2023. "Consumer loss aversion and scale-dependent psychological switching costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 214-237.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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