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Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Tommy Andersson
  • Ágnes Cseh
  • Lars Ehlers
  • Albin Erlanson

Abstract

This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation that maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable, agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.

Suggested Citation

  • Tommy Andersson & Ágnes Cseh & Lars Ehlers & Albin Erlanson, 2021. "Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 338-373, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:1:p:338-73
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180236
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Buechel, Berno & Krähenmann, Philemon, 2022. "Fixed price equilibria on peer‐to‐peer platforms: Lessons from time‐based currencies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 335-358.
    2. Altuntaş, Açelya & Phan, William & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 156-181.
    3. Echenique, Federico & Miralles, Antonio & Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    4. Biró, Péter & Klijn, Flip & Pápai, Szilvia, 2022. "Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 428-453.
    5. Xiang Han & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2021. "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1038, Boston College Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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