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Rational Expectations in Games

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Author Info
Robert J. Aumann
Jacques H. Dreze

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Abstract

A player i's actions in a game are determined by her beliefs about other players; these depend on the game's real-life context, not only its formal description. Define a game situation as a game together with such beliefs; call the beliefs -- and i's resulting expectation -- rational if there is common knowledge of rationality and a common prior. In two-person zero-sum games, i's only rational expectation is the game’s value. In an arbitrary game G, we characterize i's rational expectations in terms of the correlated equilibria of the doubled game 2G in which each of i's strategies in G appears twice. (JEL C72, D83, D84)

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 98 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 72-86
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:1:p:72-86

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  1. Itai Arieli, 2008. "Towards a Characterization of Rational Expectations," Discussion Paper Series dp475, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-16.


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