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Does Regulatory Jurisdiction Affect the Quality of Investment-Adviser Regulation?

Author

Listed:
  • Ben Charoenwong
  • Alan Kwan
  • Tarik Umar

Abstract

The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over "midsize" investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated clients. Our results inform optimal regulatory design in markets with informational asymmetries and search frictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben Charoenwong & Alan Kwan & Tarik Umar, 2019. "Does Regulatory Jurisdiction Affect the Quality of Investment-Adviser Regulation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(10), pages 3681-3712, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:10:p:3681-3712
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180412
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Jean-François Houde & Shaoteng Li & Anna V. Trubnikova, 2023. "The Role of Intermediaries in Selection Markets: Evidence form Mortgage Lending," NBER Working Papers 31989, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Stephen G. Dimmock & William C. Gerken & Tyson Van Alfen, 2021. "Real Estate Shocks and Financial Advisor Misconduct," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 3309-3346, December.
    3. Carlin, Bruce & Umar, Tarik & Yi, Hanyi, 2023. "Deputizing financial institutions to fight elder abuse," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(3), pages 557-577.
    4. Gelman, Michael & Khan, Zaheer & Shoham, Amir & Tarba, Shlomo Y., 2021. "Does local competition and firm market power affect investment adviser misconduct?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    5. Kowaleski, Zachary T. & Sutherland, Andrew G. & Vetter, Felix W., 2020. "Can ethics be taught? Evidence from securities exams and investment adviser misconduct," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 159-175.
    6. John (Jianqiu) Bai & Chenguang Shang & Chi Wan & Yijia Eddie Zhao, 2022. "Social Capital and Individual Ethics: Evidence from Financial Adviser Misconduct," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 181(2), pages 495-518, November.
    7. Vivek Bhattacharya & Gastón Illanes & Manisha Padi, 2019. "Fiduciary Duty and the Market for Financial Advice," NBER Working Papers 25861, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Yuan, Huaxi & Zou, Longhui & Feng, Yidai, 2023. "How to achieve emission reduction without hindering economic growth? The role of judicial quality," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    9. Peter Koudijs & Laura Salisbury & Gurpal Sran, 2021. "For Richer, for Poorer: Bankers' Liability and Bank Risk in New England, 1867 to 1880," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 1541-1599, June.
    10. Mark Egan & Shan Ge & Johnny Tang, 2022. "Conflicting Interests and the Effect of Fiduciary Duty: Evidence from Variable Annuities," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(12), pages 5334-5386.
    11. Cook, Jonathan & Kowaleski, Zachary T. & Minnis, Michael & Sutherland, Andrew & Zehms, Karla M., 2020. "Auditors are known by the companies they keep," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1).
    12. Wang, Yang & Ashton, John K. & Jaafar, Aziz, 2023. "Financial statement fraud, recidivism and punishment," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    13. Anna Ulrichshofer & Markus Walzl, 2020. "Customer Disputes, Misconduct, and Reputation Building in the Market for Financial Advice," Working Papers 2020-20, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    14. Müller, Karsten & Pan, Yuanyuan & Schwarz, Carlo, 2024. "Social Media and Stock Market Participation," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 699, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    15. Bruce I. Carlin & Tarik Umar & Hanyi Yi, 2020. "Deputization," NBER Working Papers 27225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Christopher P. Clifford & William C. Gerken, 2021. "Property Rights to Client Relationships and Financial Advisor Incentives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(5), pages 2409-2445, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services

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