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Advertising and Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Naoki Aizawa
  • You Suk Kim

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of advertising as a channel for risk selection in Medicare Advantage. We provide evidence that insurer advertising is responsive to the gains from risk selection. Then we develop and estimate an equilibrium model of Medicare Advantage with advertising, allowing rich individual heterogeneity. Our estimates show that advertising is effective in attracting healthy individuals who are newly eligible for Medicare, contributing to advantageous selection into Medicare Advantage. Moreover, risk selection through advertising substantially lowers premiums by improving insurers' risk pools. The distributional implication is that unhealthy consumers may be better off through cross-subsidization from healthy individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Naoki Aizawa & You Suk Kim, 2018. "Advertising and Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(3), pages 828-867, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:108:y:2018:i:3:p:828-67
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151485
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fujii Yoichiro & Ogaku Michiko & Okura Mahito & Osaki Yusuke, 2020. "How do Optimistic Individuals Affect Insurance Advertisements?," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-18, July.
    2. Naoki Aizawa & You Suk Kim, 2020. "Public and Private Provision of Information in Market-Based Public Programs: Evidence from Advertising in Health Insurance Marketplaces," NBER Working Papers 27695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bradley T. Shapiro, 2020. "Advertising in Health Insurance Markets," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(3), pages 587-611, May.
    4. Keaton S. Miller & Amil Petrin & Robert Town & Michael Chernew, 2019. "Optimal Managed Competition Subsidies," NBER Working Papers 25616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Tongil “TI” Kim & Diwas KC, 2020. "The Impact of Hospital Advertising on Patient Demand and Health Outcomes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(3), pages 612-635, May.
    6. Daniel Montanera & Abhay Nath Mishra & T. S. Raghu, 2022. "Mitigating Risk Selection in Healthcare Entitlement Programs: A Beneficiary-Level Competitive Bidding Approach," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1221-1247, December.
    7. Jiang, Yawen & Ni, Weiyi, 2020. "Impact of supplementary private health insurance on hospitalization and physical examination in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising

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    1. Advertising and Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets (AER 2018) in ReplicationWiki

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