IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ach/journl/y2015id459.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Analysis of institutional preferences in the cooperative interactions for the development of industrial enterprises

Author

Listed:
  • I. S. Kukaev

Abstract

Since the Russian Federation has chosen a strategy towards orientation on import substitution, the topic of searching for alternative ways of industrial enterprise development becomes the primary interest. One of the approaches is cooperative interactions in the form of business associations. Preferences in regard to making a decision towards these collective actions present a scientific interest and are studied in this article on the example of Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) and Russian union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE). This article summarizes positive and negative impacts of business associations on industry development. A description of historical evolution of institutional cooperative interactions in the post-soviet period is supplemented with analysis of the degree of planning economy and soviet regime influence on characteristics of multisectoral business associations. The role of cooperative interactions in the form of business associations for filling the institutional void after the change of political regime is highlighted.The reasons for formation of cooperative interactions in the form of business associations are presented. Business directions, goals, and opportunities for enterprises are delineated , for which business associations can present a driving force to achieve the targets. Preconditions for preference formation among economic agents towards particular institutions are defined. An analysis of positive and negative outcomes of business associations impact on industry development is conducted contributing to the theory of Russian industrial enterprises strategical management.The article analyses differences between various economic agents on the example of Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) and the Russian union of industrialists and entrepreneurs (RUIE). Regional CCI offices are preferred to RUIE ones when it comes to decide on participation in a multisectoral business association.

Suggested Citation

  • I. S. Kukaev, 2015. "Analysis of institutional preferences in the cooperative interactions for the development of industrial enterprises," Russian Journal of Industrial Economics, MISIS, issue 2.
    • Handle: RePEc:ach:journl:y:2015:id:459
    DOI: 10.17073/2072-1633-2015-2-24-29
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ecoprom.misis.ru/jour/article/viewFile/459/450
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.17073/2072-1633-2015-2-24-29?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Recanatini, Francesca & Ryterman, Randi, 2001. "Disorganization or self-organization : the emergence of business associations in a transition economy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2539, The World Bank.
    2. McMenamin Iain, 2002. "Polish Business Associations: Flattened Civil Society or Super Lobbies?," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(3), pages 1-19, November.
    3. Timothy Frye, 2002. "Capture or Exchange? Business Lobbying in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(7), pages 1017-1036.
    4. William Pyle, 2006. "Collective action and post-communist enterprise: The economic logic of Russia's business associations," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 58(4), pages 491-521.
    5. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005. "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 131-150, Winter.
    6. Frye, Timothy, 2004. "Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 453-466, August.
    7. Johnson, Simon & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Contract Enforcement in Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2081, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Paul Kubicek, 1996. "Variations on a corporatist theme: Interest associations in post‐soviet Ukraine and Russia," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(1), pages 27-46.
    9. Laura Solanko, 2008. "Unequal fortunes: a note on income convergence across Russian regions," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(3), pages 287-301.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1cu21pio6c90g9i5oedr5hnaa3 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Huber, Peter & Wörgötter, Andreas, 1998. "Political Survival or Entrepreneurial Development? Observations on Russian Business Networks," MPRA Paper 20412, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Jeffrey B. Nugent & Grigor. Sukiassyan, 2009. "Alternative Strategies For Firms In Oppressive And Corrupt States: Informality Or Formality Via Business Associations?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(4), pages 423-439, October.
    13. McMenamin, Iain, 2002. "Polish Business Associations: Flattened Civil Society or Super Lobbies?," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 301-317, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. William Pyle, 2006. "Collective action and post-communist enterprise: The economic logic of Russia's business associations," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 58(4), pages 491-521.
    2. William Pyle, 2006. "Collective action and post-communist enterprise: The economic logic of Russia's business associations," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 58(4), pages 491-521.
    3. William Pyle & Laura Solanko, 2013. "The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 19-41, April.
    4. Yakovlev, A. & Govorun, A., 2011. "Business Associations as a Business-Government Liaison: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 9, pages 98-127.
    5. Andrei Yakovlev & Andrei Govorun, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 116, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    6. Goriaev, Alexei & Zabotkin, Alexei, 2006. "Risks of investing in the Russian stock market: Lessons of the first decade," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 380-397, December.
    7. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2009. "State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin," International Economic Association Series, in: János Kornai & László Mátyás & Gérard Roland (ed.), Corruption, Development and Institutional Design, chapter 2, pages 24-36, Palgrave Macmillan.
    8. Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Collective Action Abroad: How Foreign Investors Organize Evidence from Foreign Business Associations In the Russian Federation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 32/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. repec:zbw:bofitp:2007_018 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Andrei Govorun, 2013. "The choice of lobbying strategy: direct contacts with officials or mediation via business associations," HSE Working papers WP BRP 24/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    11. 岩﨑, 一郎 & Iwasaki, Ichiro & イワサキ, イチロウ, 2007. "取締役会構成とその内生性 : ロシア株式会社の実証分析, Board Formation and its Endogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of Russian Corporations," Discussion Paper Series b37, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    12. Andrei Govorun & Israel Marques & William Pyle, 2013. "The political roots of intermediated lobbying: evidence from Russian firms and business associations," HSE Working papers WP BRP 46/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    13. Iwasaki, Ichiro & 岩﨑, 一郎 & イワサキ, イチロウ, 2012. "Global Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Firm Survival: The Case of Russia," RRC Working Paper Series 37, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    14. Grosman, Anna & Leiponen, Aija, 2018. "Organizational transparency and power in firm ownership networks," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1158-1177.
    15. Libman, Alexander, 2006. "Zum Spannungsfeld zwischen staatlicher und privater Wirtschaft am Beispiel der postsowjetischen Staaten [On the interaction of public and private businesses: Example of the post-Soviet space]," MPRA Paper 10941, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. William Pyle, 2007. "Organized Business, Political Regimes and Property Rights across the Russian Federation," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0703, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    17. Alexander Libman, 2006. "Government-Business Relations and Catching Up Reforms in the CIS," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 3(2), pages 263-288, December.
    18. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "State Capture in a Federation," Working Papers w0093, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    19. Iwasaki, Ichiro & 岩﨑, 一郎, 2013. "Global Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Firm Survival: The Russian Experience," RRC Working Paper Series 37_v2, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    20. Pyle, William & Solanko, Laura, 2010. "The composition and interests of Russia's business lobbies: A test of Olson's "encompassing organization" hypothesis," BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2010, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    21. Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2014. "Global financial crisis, corporate governance, and firm survival:," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 178-211.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ach:journl:y:2015:id:459. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Главный контакт редакции (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://misis.ru .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.