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Optimal dynamic information provision

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Xu, Hedong & Tian, Cunzhi & Ye, Wenxing & Fan, Suohai, 2018. "Effects of investors’ power correlations in the power-based game on networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 506(C), pages 424-432.
  2. Wang, Jun & Qin, Yanjun & Zhou, Jingyang, 2021. "Incentive policies for prefabrication implementation of real estate enterprises: An evolutionary game theory-based analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
  3. Miltiadis Makris & Ludovic Renou, 2018. "Information design in multi-stage games," Working Papers 861, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  4. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon, 2023. "Markovian persuasion with two states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 292-314.
  5. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  6. Caio Lorecchio, 2022. "Persuading crowds," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/434, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
  7. Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2024. "Contracting over persistent information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
  8. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Rainer, Catherine & Solan, Eilon, 2020. "Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 83-104.
  9. Aradhye, Aditya & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023. "Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 303-320.
  10. Xu, Hedong & Tian, Cunzhi & Xiao, Xinrong & Fan, Suohai, 2018. "Evolutionary investors’ power-based game on networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 330(C), pages 125-133.
  11. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  12. Xu, Hedong & Fan, Suohai & Tian, Cunzhi & Xiao, Xinrong, 2019. "Evolutionary investor sharing game on networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 340(C), pages 138-145.
  13. Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    • Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  14. Jibang Wu & Zixuan Zhang & Zhe Feng & Zhaoran Wang & Zhuoran Yang & Michael I. Jordan & Haifeng Xu, 2022. "Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning," Papers 2202.10678, arXiv.org.
  15. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2021. "Markovian Persuasion," Papers 2111.14365, arXiv.org.
  16. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
  17. Shota Ichihashi, 2023. "Dynamic Privacy Choices," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 1-40, May.
  18. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
  19. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas S Lambert, 2021. "Motivational Ratings [Toward the Next Generation of Recommender Systems: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art and Possible Extensions]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1892-1935.
  20. Herbert Sylvérie, 2022. "State-dependent Central Bank Communication with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Working papers 875, Banque de France.
  21. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  22. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 506-560, May.
  23. Saed Alizamir & Francis de Véricourt & Shouqiang Wang, 2020. "Warning Against Recurring Risks: An Information Design Approach," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4612-4629, October.
  24. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon, 2023. "Markovian persuasion with two states," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119970, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  25. Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Dynamic information design," Papers 2005.07267, arXiv.org.
  26. Hahn, Niklas & Hoefer, Martin & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2022. "The secretary recommendation problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 199-228.
  27. Can Küçükgül & Özalp Özer & Shouqiang Wang, 2022. "Engineering Social Learning: Information Design of Time-Locked Sales Campaigns for Online Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4899-4918, July.
  28. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  29. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
  30. Maxim Senkov, 2022. "Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade," Papers 2210.08294, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
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