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Markets, torts, and social inefficiency

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim & Rasch, Alexander, 2016. "Why product liability may lower product safety," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 55-58.
  2. BOYER, Marcel & PORRINI, Donatella, 2010. "Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors : An Exploratory Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 05-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  3. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2013. "Cumulative Harm, Products Liability, and Bilateral Care," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 15(2), pages 409-442.
  4. Lam, Wing Man Wynne, 2014. "Ex Ante and Ex Post Investments in Cybersecurity," TSE Working Papers 14-519, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  5. Elizabeth Klee & Lewis Kornhauser, 2007. "Comparisons of the Incentive for Insolvency under Different Legal Regimes," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 141-170, January.
  6. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2014. "Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(2), pages 371-400.
  7. Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2022. "Endogenous market structures, product liability, and the scope of product differentiation," Working Papers hal-04159801, HAL.
  8. Yongmin Chen & Xinyu Hua, 2017. "Competition, Product Safety, and Product Liability," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 237-267.
  9. Boyer, Marcel & Porrini, Donatella, 2011. "The impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for environmental/industrial accidents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 21-29, March.
  10. Yassine Lefouili & Leonardo Madio, 2022. "The economics of platform liability," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 319-351, June.
  11. Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2022. "Incentives to differentiate under environmental liability laws : Product customization and precautionary effort," EconomiX Working Papers 2022-20, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  12. Gérard Mondello, 2022. "Strict liability, scarce generic input and duopoly competition," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 369-404, December.
  13. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe & Kristoffel Grechenig, 2010. "Switching Consumers and Product Liability: On the Optimality of Incomplete Strict Liability," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  14. Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte, 2022. "Firm Liability When Third Parties and Consumers Incur Cumulative Harm," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 81(1), pages 53-71, January.
  15. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2015. "Optimal Damages Multipliers in Oligopolistic Markets," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 622-640, December.
  16. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2008. "The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor For Environmental Disasters: Lessons For Optimal Insurance Regulation," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-03, CIRANO.
  17. Lam, Wing Man Wynne, 2016. "Attack-prevention and damage-control investments in cybersecurity," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 42-51.
  18. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2007. "Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-04, CIRANO.
  19. Doh-Shin Jeon & Yassine Lefouili & Leonardo Madio, 2021. "Platform Liability and Innovation," Working Papers 21-05, NET Institute.
  20. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe & Alexander Rasch, 2015. "The Influence of Product Liability on Vertical Product Differentiation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5315, CESifo.
  21. Ping Lin & Tianle Zhang, 2022. "Product liability, multidimensional R&D and innovation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 25-45, June.
  22. Christoph Rössler & Tim Friehe, 2020. "Liability, morality, and image concerns in product accidents with third parties," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 295-312, October.
  23. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2021. "Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and the allocation of consumers to firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  24. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe & Alexander Rasch, 2018. "Product Liability in Markets for Vertically Differentiated Products," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 46-81.
  25. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim & Grechenig, Kristoffel, 2011. "A note on the optimality of (even more) incomplete strict liability," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 77-82, June.
  26. Eric Langlais & Tim Friehe & Elisabeth Schulte, 2019. "Product liability when cumulative harm is incurred by both consumers and third parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2019-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  27. Lam, W., 2015. "Attack-Deterring and Damage-Control Investments in Cybersecurity," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2015023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  28. Sungho Yun, 2018. "Minimum safety standards with asymmetric safety costs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 152-173, April.
  29. Chen, Yongmin & Hua, Xinyu, 2010. "Ex ante Investment, Ex post Remedy, and Product Liability," MPRA Paper 22031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Tim Friehe & Cat Lam Pham & Thomas J. Miceli, 2022. "Product Liability and Strategic Delegation: Endogenous Manager Incentives Promote Strict Liability," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(2), pages 149-169, September.
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