IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/vfsc21/242359.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Naïve Consumers and Financial Mistakes

Author

Listed:
  • Exler, Florian
  • Hansak, Alexander

Abstract

Financial contracts are complicated and consumers often do not grasp them in their entirety. This may lead to financial mistakes. We develop a quantitative theory of unsecured credit and equilibrium default in a market with sophisticated and näive borrowers who sometimes misunderstand their contracts and make financial mistakes. Näives are more prone to mistakes without internalizing this fact. When signing debt contracts, we allow agents to trade off interest rates for penalty fees. These fees make financial mistakes costly. Näives choose inefficiently high penalty fees and cross-subsidize interest rates for sophisticates. We use this framework to analyze two unexplored features of the CARD act: clearer language requirements and a limit on penalty fees in financial contracts. Clearer contract terms lead to fewer financial mistakes by everyone, while limiting fees constrains mostly näive borrowers. Both policies reduce financial mistakes and increase the welfare of näive borrowers. The effects on sophisticates differ: clearer language and fewer mistakes benefit sophisticates too. However, limiting fees reduces the cross-subsidization sophisticates receive in equilibrium and consequently makes them worse off.

Suggested Citation

  • Exler, Florian & Hansak, Alexander, 2021. "Naïve Consumers and Financial Mistakes," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242359, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc21:242359
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/242359/1/vfs-2021-pid-49181.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2012. "Consumer Protection and Contingent Charges," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 477-493, June.
    2. Sumit Agarwal & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Neale Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel, 2015. "Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(1), pages 111-164.
    3. Nakajima, Makoto, 2017. "Assessing bankruptcy reform in a model with temptation and equilibrium default," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 42-64.
    4. Tertilt, Michèle & Exler, Florian & Livshits, Igor & MacGee, Jim, 2020. "Consumer Credit with Over-Optimistic Borrowers," CEPR Discussion Papers 15570, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2018. "Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets," Chapters, in: Victor J. Tremblay & Elizabeth Schroeder & Carol Horton Tremblay (ed.), Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization, chapter 3, pages 40-74, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Exler, Florian & Tertilt, Michèle, 2020. "Consumer Debt and Default: A Macro Perspective," IZA Discussion Papers 12966, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Gajendran Raveendranathan & Georgios Stefanidis, 2020. "The Unprecedented Fall in U.S. Revolving Credit," Department of Economics Working Papers 2020-05, McMaster University.
    8. Exler, Florian & Tertilt, Michèle, 2020. "Consumer Debt and Default: A Macro Perspective," IZA Discussion Papers 12966, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Oren Bar-Gill, 2015. "Price Caps in Multiprice Markets," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 453-476.
    2. Tertilt, Michèle & Exler, Florian & Livshits, Igor & MacGee, Jim, 2020. "Consumer Credit with Over-Optimistic Borrowers," CEPR Discussion Papers 15570, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Bourguignon, Hélène & Gomes, Renato & Tirole, Jean, 2019. "Shrouded transaction costs: must-take cards, discounts and surcharges," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 99-144.
    4. Michael D. Grubb, 2015. "Overconfident Consumers in the Marketplace," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(4), pages 9-36, Fall.
    5. K. Jeremy Ko & Jared Williams, 2017. "The Effects of Regulating Hidden Add‐On Costs," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(1), pages 39-74, February.
    6. McGowan, Féidhlim, 2018. "The roaming regulation and the case for applying behavioural industrial organisation to EU competition policy," Papers WP598, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    7. Gamp, Tobias & Krähmer, Daniel, 2022. "Competition in Search Markets with Naive Consumers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 364, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    8. Tobias Gamp & Daniel Krähmer, 2022. "Competition in search markets with naive consumers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 356-385, June.
    9. Tirole, Jean & Gomes, Renato & Bourguignon, Hélène, 2014. "Shrouded Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 10171, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Tobias Gamp & Daniel Kraehmer, 2018. "Deception and Competition in Search Markets," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_014_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    11. Renato Gomes & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Missed Sales and the Pricing of Ancillary Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(4), pages 2097-2169.
    12. Gajendran Raveendranathan & Georgios Stefanidis, 2022. "Designing “Win-Win” Rate Caps," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-03, McMaster University.
    13. Jennifer L. Dlugosz & Brian T. Melzer & Donald P. Morgan, 2021. "Who Pays the Price? Overdraft Fee Ceilings and the Unbanked," Staff Reports 973, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    14. John Y. Campbell, 2016. "Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 1-30, May.
    15. Michel, Christian, 2017. "Market regulation of voluntary add-on contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 239-268.
    16. Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi Christina, 2022. "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
    17. Lukas, Moritz & Nöth, Markus, 2022. "Voluntary minimum repayments and borrower heterogeneity: Evidence from revolving consumer credit," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    18. Sule, Alan & Cemalcilar, Mehmet & Karlan, Dean S. & Zinman, Jonathan, 2015. "Unshrouding Effects on Demand for a Costly Add-on: Evidence from Bank Overdrafts in Turkey," Center Discussion Papers 198558, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    19. Francisco Gomes & Michael Haliassos & Tarun Ramadorai, 2021. "Household Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 919-1000, September.
    20. D׳Agostino, Elena & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2016. "Protecting buyers from fine print," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 42-54.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consumer Credit; Näiveté; Financial Mistakes; Bankruptcy; CARDAct; Cross-Subsidization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G41 - Financial Economics - - Behavioral Finance - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making in Financial Markets
    • G51 - Financial Economics - - Household Finance - - - Household Savings, Borrowing, Debt, and Wealth
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc21:242359. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.