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Von der Währungs- zur Transferunion

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  • König, Jörg

Abstract

Die Einheit Europas ist ohne jede Abstriche ein wertvolles und erstrebenswertes Ziel. Schließlich ist eine stabilitätsund wachstumsfördernde Gemeinschaft, die auf gleichen Werten und Prinzipien beruht, eine wichtige Voraussetzung für den Erfolg des Integrations- und Friedensprojekts Europäische Union. Mit Blick auf die Konstruktionsschwächen des gemeinsamen Währungsverbunds und den induzierten Fehlanreizen zweifelhafter Euro-"Rettungsaktionen" der vergangenen Jahre, ist die Erreichung dieses Ziels jedoch in weite Ferne gerückt. Insbesondere die nicht enden wollende Odyssee der Griechenland-"Rettung", deren Ausgang nach wie vor ungewiss ist, hat verdeutlicht, dass Solidarität in Europa keine Einbahnstraße sein darf. Zur kollektiven Solidarität gehören nicht nur einseitige Hilfen, sondern auch die Verpflichtung zu eigenverantwortlicher finanzieller Solidität und die Einhaltung gemeinsam getroffener Regeln. Beide Prinzipien wurden jedoch wiederholt und vorsätzlich verletzt. Fiskalische Defizitgrenzen wurden weit überschritten und Überschreitungen teilweise gekonnt verschleiert, Reformen wurden mehrfach nicht umgesetzt, "letzte und allerletzte Fristen" hat man bewusst verstreichen lassen. "Wenn es ernst wird, muss man lügen", hat der heutige EU-Kommissionspräsident Jean-Claude Juncker einmal behauptet. Wenn Verschleierungstaktiken nicht nur der griechischen Regierung, sondern auch der europäischen Gläubiger - beispielsweise in Bezug auf die Nicht-Beistandsklausel für Mitgliedstaaten und das EZB-Verbot der monetären Staatsfinanzierung - allerdings dazu führen, dass sich immer größere Teile der Bevölkerung entmündigt fühlen und in der Folge Links- und Rechtspopulisten europaweit großen Zulauf erhalten, gefährdet diese Politik das Integrations- und Friedensprojekt Europa mehr denn je. Daher müssen die Risiken der Euro-"Rettungspolitik" offengelegt und als Chance zur Neuordnung der Währungsunion begriffen werden. Zu den Risiken gehört, dass Kredithilfen an offenkundig insolvente und reformunwillige Staaten de facto finanzielle Transfers bedeuten. Die Euro-Staaten haften für Verbindlichkeiten eines anderen Mitgliedes und verstoßen somit gegen geltendes EU-Recht. Der Anreiz zu eigenverantwortlicher und solider Finanzpolitik wird erheblich reduziert, obwohl letzteres im Eigeninteresse der Staaten liegen sollte. [...]

Suggested Citation

  • König, Jörg, 2016. "Von der Währungs- zur Transferunion," Argumente zur Marktwirtschaft und Politik 132, Stiftung Marktwirtschaft / The Market Economy Foundation, Berlin.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:smwarg:132
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