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How special are they? Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking

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  • Tröger, Tobias H.

Abstract

This essay argues that at least some of the financial stability concerns associated with shadow banking can be addressed by an approach to financial regulation that imports its functional foundations more vigorously into the interpretation and implementation of existing rules. It shows that the general policy goals of prudential banking regulation remain constant over time despite dramatic transformations in the financial and technological landscape. Moreover, these overarching policy goals also legitimize intervention in the shadow banking sector. On these grounds, this essay encourages a more normative construction of available rules that potentially limits both the scope for regulatory arbitrage and the need for ever more rapid updates and a constant increase in the complexity of the regulatory framework. By tying the regulatory treatment of financial innovation closely to existing prudential rules and their underlying policy rationales, the proposed approach potentially ends the socially wasteful race between hare and tortoise that signifies the relation between regulators and a highly dynamic industry. In doing so it does not generally hamper market participants' efficient discoveries where disintermediation proves socially beneficial. Instead, it only weeds-out rent-seeking circumventions of existing rules and standards.

Suggested Citation

  • Tröger, Tobias H., 2014. "How special are they? Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking," SAFE Working Paper Series 68, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewp:68
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2505909
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    Cited by:

    1. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2014. "Are rules and boundaries sufficient to limit harmful central bank discretion? Lessons from Europe," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 121-125.
    2. Brühl, Volker & Gründl, Helmut & Hackethal, Andreas & Kotz, Hans-Helmut & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Tröger, Tobias, 2015. "Comments on the EU Commission's capital markets union project," SAFE White Paper Series 27, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. John B. Taylor & Volker Wieland, 2016. "Finding the Equilibrium Real Interest Rate in a Fog of Policy Deviations," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 51(3), pages 147-154, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    shadow banking; regulatory arbitrage; prudential supervision;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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