IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/dyncon/v49y2014icp121-125.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are rules and boundaries sufficient to limit harmful central bank discretion? Lessons from Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Orphanides, Athanasios

Abstract

Marvin Goodfriend׳s (2014) insightful, informative and provocative work explains concisely and convincingly why the Fed needs rules and boundaries. This paper reviews the broader institutional design problem regarding the effectiveness of the central bank in practice and confirms the need for rules and boundaries. The framework proposed for improving the Fed incorporates key elements that have already been adopted in the European Union. The case of ELA provision by the ECB and the Central Bank of Cyprus to Marfin-Laiki Bank during the crisis, however, suggests that the existence of rules and boundaries may not be enough to limit harmful discretion. During a crisis, novel interpretations of the legal authority of the central bank may be introduced to create a grey area that might be exploited to justify harmful discretionary decisions even in the presence of rules and boundaries. This raises the question how to ensure that rules and boundaries are respected in practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Orphanides, Athanasios, 2014. "Are rules and boundaries sufficient to limit harmful central bank discretion? Lessons from Europe," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 121-125.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:49:y:2014:i:c:p:121-125
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.09.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188914002206
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.09.008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wieland, Volker & Wolters, Maik, 2014. "Is there a threat of self-reinforcing deflation in the euro area? A view through the lens of the Phillips curve," Kiel Policy Brief 79, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. John Cogan & John Taylor & Volker Wieland & Maik Wolters, 2013. "Fiscal Consolidation Strategy: An Update for the Budget Reform Proposal of March 2013," Discussion Papers 12-033, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    3. Tröger, Tobias, 2013. "Konzernverantwortung in der aufsichtsunterworfenen Finanzbranche," IMFS Working Paper Series 69, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    4. John B. Taylor & Volker Wieland, 2012. "Surprising Comparative Properties of Monetary Models: Results from a New Model Database," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(3), pages 800-816, August.
    5. Tillmann, Peter, 2013. "Capital inflows and asset prices: Evidence from emerging Asia," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 717-729.
    6. Wieland, Volker & Wolters, Maik, 2013. "Forecasting and Policy Making," Handbook of Economic Forecasting, in: G. Elliott & C. Granger & A. Timmermann (ed.), Handbook of Economic Forecasting, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 239-325, Elsevier.
    7. Binder, Michael & Bluhm, Marcel, 2014. "On the Conditional Effects of IMF Loan Program Participation on Output Growth," IMFS Working Paper Series 78, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    8. Athanasios Orphanides, 2016. "What Happened in Cyprus? The Economic Consequences of the Last Communist Government in Europe," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Alexander Michaelides & Athanasios Orphanides (ed.), THE CYPRUS BAIL-IN POLICY LESSONS FROM THE CYPRUS ECONOMIC CRISIS, chapter 5, pages 163-207, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Burgert, Matthias & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2014. "Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 282-299.
    10. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2013. "Is monetary policy overburdened?," IMFS Working Paper Series 75, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    11. Issing Otmar & Wieland Volker, 2013. "Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy: Reflections on the Development over the last 150 Years," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 233(3), pages 423-445, June.
    12. Tröger, Tobias H., 2014. "How special are they? Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking," IMFS Working Paper Series 83, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    13. Siekmann, Helmut, 2014. "Zur Offenlegung der Bezüge von Sparkassenführungskräften im Internet," IMFS Working Paper Series 77, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    14. Remsperger, Hermann, 2014. "Der makroprudenzielle Komplex: Der Prozess, das Schloss, das Urteil," SAFE White Paper Series 17, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    15. Markus Behn & Rainer Haselmann & Vikrant Vig, 2022. "The Limits of Model‐Based Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1635-1684, June.
    16. Henry C. Simons, 1936. "Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44, pages 1-1.
    17. Remsperger, Hermann, 2014. "Der makroprudenzielle Komplex: der Prozess, das Schloss, das Urteil," IMFS Working Paper Series 80, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    18. Wolters Maik H. & Tillmann Peter, 2015. "The changing dynamics of US inflation persistence: a quantile regression approach," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 161-182, April.
    19. Cogan, John F. & Taylor, John B. & Wieland, Volker & Wolters, Maik H., 2013. "Fiscal consolidation strategy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 404-421.
    20. Siekmann, Helmut & Wieland, Volker, 2013. "The European Central Bank’s outright monetary transactions and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany," IMFS Working Paper Series 71, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    21. Athanasios Orphanides, 2014. "The Euro Area Crisis: Politics over Economics," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(3), pages 243-263, September.
    22. Goodfriend, Marvin, 2014. "Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 112-120.
    23. Afanasyeva, Elena, 2013. "Atypical behavior of credit: Evidence from a monetary VAR," IMFS Working Paper Series 70, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    24. Siekmann, Helmut, 2012. "Missachtung rechtlicher Vorgaben des AEUV durch die Mitgliedstaaten und die EZB in der Schuldenkrise," IMFS Working Paper Series 65, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    25. Bletzinger, Tilman & Wieland, Volker, 2013. "Estimating the European Central Bank's "Extended Period of Time"," IMFS Working Paper Series 74, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    26. Yoo, Y. Emilie, 2013. "Financial regulation and supervision across business lines in the United States: Financial holding companies post Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act," IMFS Working Paper Series 76, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    27. Athanasios Orphanides, 2014. "The Need for a Price Stability Mandate," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 34(2), pages 265-279, Spring/Su.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. John B. Taylor & Volker Wieland, 2016. "Finding the Equilibrium Real Interest Rate in a Fog of Policy Deviations," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 51(3), pages 147-154, July.
    2. Jorg Bibow, 2015. "The Euro's Savior? Assessing the ECB's Crisis Management Performance and Potential for Crisis Resolution," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_845, Levy Economics Institute.
    3. Christian Pfister, Natacha Valla, 2018. "‘New Normal’ or ‘New Orthodoxy’? Elements of a Central Banking Framework for the After-Crisis," Working papers 680, Banque de France.
    4. Ioanna Kokores, 2015. "Lean-Against-the-Wind Monetary Policy: The Post-Crisis Shift in the Literature," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 65(3-4), pages 66-99, july-Dece.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wieland, Volker & Wolters, Maik, 2014. "Is there a threat of self-reinforcing deflation in the euro area? A view through the lens of the Phillips curve," Kiel Policy Brief 79, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Burgert, Matthias & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2014. "Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 282-299.
    3. John B. Taylor & Volker Wieland, 2016. "Finding the Equilibrium Real Interest Rate in a Fog of Policy Deviations," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 51(3), pages 147-154, July.
    4. John Cogan & John Taylor & Volker Wieland & Maik Wolters, 2013. "Fiscal Consolidation Strategy: An Update for the Budget Reform Proposal of March 2013," Discussion Papers 12-033, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    5. Bofinger, Peter & Schnabel, Isabel & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Wieland, Volker, 2014. "Mehr Vertrauen in Marktprozesse. Jahresgutachten 2014/15 [More confidence in market processes. Annual Report 2014/15]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201415.
    6. Wieland, V. & Afanasyeva, E. & Kuete, M. & Yoo, J., 2016. "New Methods for Macro-Financial Model Comparison and Policy Analysis," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1241-1319, Elsevier.
    7. Bofinger, Peter & Buch, Claudia M. & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Wieland, Volker, 2013. "Gegen eine rückwärtsgewandte Wirtschaftspolitik. Jahresgutachten 2013/14 [Against a backward-looking economic policy. Annual Report 2013/14]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201314.
    8. Lindé, Jesper & Smets, Frank & Wouters, Rafael, 2016. "Challenges for Central Banks´ Macro Models," Working Paper Series 323, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    9. Wieland, Volker & Wolters, Maik, 2013. "Forecasting and Policy Making," Handbook of Economic Forecasting, in: G. Elliott & C. Granger & A. Timmermann (ed.), Handbook of Economic Forecasting, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 239-325, Elsevier.
    10. John B. Taylor, 2017. "Rules Versus Discretion: Assessing the Debate Over the Conduct of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 24149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Reicher, Claire, 2014. "Systematic fiscal policy and macroeconomic performance: A critical overview of the literature," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 8, pages 1-37.
    12. Laica, Christoph & Lauber, Arne & Sahm, Marco, 2017. "Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes," BERG Working Paper Series 129, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    13. John B. Taylor, 2015. "Using Hybrid Macro-Econometric Models to Design and Evaluate Fiscal Consolidation Strategies," Economics Working Papers 15117, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    14. Athanasios Orphanides, 2015. "Fear of Liftoff: Uncertainty, Rules, and Discretion in Monetary Policy Normalization," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 97(3).
    15. Andrea Giorgio Tosato, 2022. "Considerations on the Monetary Policy Framework of the European Central Bank," CBM Working Papers WP/01/2022, Central Bank of Malta.
    16. Schwarzmüller, Tim & Wolters, Maik H., 2014. "The macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation in dynamic general equilibrium," Kiel Working Papers 1963, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    17. Feld, Lars P. & Köhler, Ekkehard A. & Nientiedt, Daniel, 2017. "The "dark ages" of German macroeconomics and other alleged shortfalls in German economic thought," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 17/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    18. Jorg Bibow, 2015. "The Euro's Savior? Assessing the ECB's Crisis Management Performance and Potential for Crisis Resolution," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_845, Levy Economics Institute.
    19. Bletzinger, Tilman & Wieland, Volker, 2016. "Forward guidance and "lower for longer": The case of the ECB," IMFS Working Paper Series 102, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    20. Lieberknecht, Philipp & Wieland, Volker, 2019. "On the macroeconomic and fiscal effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act," IMFS Working Paper Series 131, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rules; Discretion; Central bank mandates; ECB; Central bank of Cyprus; ELA;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:49:y:2014:i:c:p:121-125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.