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Corruption and Political Competition

Author

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  • Damania, Richard
  • Yalcýn, Erkan

Abstract

There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it.

Suggested Citation

  • Damania, Richard & Yalcýn, Erkan, 2008. "Corruption and Political Competition," Economics Discussion Papers 2008-7, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7128
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dash, Bharatee Bhushan & Mukherjee, Sacchidananda, 2013. "Does Political Competition Influence Human Development? Evidence from the Indian States," Working Papers 13/118, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    2. Kiselev, Eugene, 2013. "Lobbying, Corruption, and Regulatory Constraints: An Analysis of Eastern European Business Associations," MPRA Paper 51936, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Miguel Ángel Borrella Mas, 2015. "Partisan Alignment and Political Corruption. Theory and Evidence from Spain Job Market Paper," Working Papers. Serie AD 2015-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Deepti Kohli & Meeta Keswani Mehra, "undated". "Impact of Electoral Competition, Swing Voters and Interest Group Lobbying on Strategic Determination of Equilibrium Policy Platforms," Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Discussion Papers 20-02, Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
    5. Datta, Sandip, 2020. "Political competition and public healthcare expenditure: Evidence from Indian states," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 244(C).
    6. Bharatee Bhusana Dash & Sacchidananda Mukherjee, 2015. "Political Competition and Human Development: Evidence from the Indian States," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(1), pages 1-14, January.
    7. Vivek JADHAV & Dr. Shrabani MUKHERJEE, 2024. "Nexus between political federalism, social diversity and human development in India," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(1(638), S), pages 187-200, Spring.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; lobbying; political competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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